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Abstract  
 
The following research report is an analysis of the diplomatic history paradigm of South 
Africa’s switch in diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China to the People’s 
Republic of China in November 1996. Previously classified documentation from the 
Department of International Relations and Cooperation, and the African National Congress’ 
Liberation Archives at Fort Hare University, and with interviews with former ANC/National 
Executive Committee members and Department of Foreign Affairs officials, along with the 
inclusion of the memoirs of the former ROC and PRC ambassadors at the time of the switch, 
provide valuable insight into the timing of the announcement and the factors that prompted 
the decision. This research aims to aid our understanding of the foreign policy decision 
making process under the Mandela administration.   
 
 
Keywords: Archival research, the African National Congress (ANC), chequebook diplomacy, the 
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), diplomatic recognition, dual recognition, foreign policy 
analysis, the Mandela administration, the National Executive Committee (NEC), One China principle, 
South African foreign policy decision making.   
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction  
South Africa’s ‘two China’ Dilemma 	
In 1994, the newly democratic South African government, under the Mandela administration, 
inherited trade and investment ties with both the ROC and the PRC yet held diplomatic 
relations with only the ROC.1 Whilst the ROC respected the PRC’s ardent belief that Taiwan 
formed part of the PRC, the ROC advocated for two governments, or sovereign authorities. 
This was juxtaposed against the PRC continued insistence of the One China principle2 or 
‘one China, two systems’, particularly as the international system increasingly accepted the 
PRC as the ‘legitimate’ China. This presented a dilemma to the new dispensation as they 
grappled with how to continue their relations with the ROC all the while improving their ties 
with the PRC. This was coupled with balancing their domestic challenges with the hopes of 
re-emerging as an international player after years of being regarded as a ‘pariah’ nation given 
the atrocities of the apartheid government. The PRC had no objection to South Africa 
continuing non-official relations with the ROC, and likewise had not objected to trade 
relations between South Africa and the ROC.3 What the PRC did take exception to was South 
Africa’s pursuance of establishing diplomatic relations with both the ROC and the PRC, a so-
called ‘dual recognition’, and began to place increasing pressure on South Africa, often 
through a ‘carrot and stick’ approach,4 to downgrade its official relations with the ROC and 
recognise the PRC as the exclusive representative of China.  
 
Between 1993 and 1996, policy-makers, scholars, and journalists alike afforded a great deal 
of attention to the issue of South Africa’s ‘two China dilemma’, debating when South Africa 
would formally downgrade diplomatic relations with the ROC and enter into full diplomatic 
relations of the PRC. The uncertainty surrounding the dilemma was fuelled by conflicting 
high-level delegations to both the ROC and the PRC, and reciprocated visits from Taiwanese 
and Chinese officials. Furthermore, President Nelson Mandela made multiple contradictory 																																																								
1 The specifics of said trade and investment ties are explored in greater detail in the literature review. For 
2 This will be discussed more rigorously in the literature review.  
3 R. Suttner, "Dilemmas of South African foreign policy: The question of China." South Africa and the two 
Chinas dilemma, (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs and the Foundation of Global 
Dialogue 1995), 7. 
4 These approaches will become evident as the research report analyses the archival documentation and 
interviews. In particular, Chapter Four devotes attention to the impact of Chinese diplomacy in this case study.  
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statements on the recognition dilemma, often reassuring reporters that South Africa would 
not sever diplomatic ties with the ROC because doing so would be “immoral”.5 One such 
reassurance came at the end of August 1996. However, less than three months later, on the 
27th November 1996, President Mandela announced that South Africa would be severing its 
diplomatic ties with the ROC, and would establish official diplomatic relations with the PRC 
from 1 January 1998.6  
 
The switch in recognition, whilst not unexpected, did cause confusion especially in relation to 
the apparent sudden timing.7 Until now, the timing and decision making process of the 
decision have only been speculated. There has been an absence of evidentiary documentation 
that illuminates the sequence of events, the decision making process, the key actors, 
especially the role of the NEC,8 and why the switch was announced, seemingly abruptly, on 
the 27th November 1996. A major reason for this absence is due to the classification of 
documentation pertaining to South Africa’s foreign policy recognising the PRC. The year 
2016 marked the 20th anniversary of the announcement of the switch, and under South 
Africa’s Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA), classified documentation that has 
passed a twenty-year classification period is made available to the public.9 Thus, the 
acquirement of over 400 pages of never-before-seen, utilised or cited documentation from the 
archives of DIRCO and Fort Hare afford this research report an opportunity to fully analyse 
and understand how the decision was reached. The ‘switch’ has been deemed one of 
democratic South Africa’s first substantive foreign policy decisions,10 and its importance in 
understanding how decision making occurred under the ANC and Mandela administration 
cannot be overlooked.  
 																																																								
5 Examples of these assurances include Sapa-Reuter, ‘Mandela Reaffirms Ties with Taiwan,’ The Star, 25 April 
1995, Sapa-AFP, ‘Taiwan Connection: Still Firm Friends,’ The Daily News, 4 July 1996, and SAPA-AFP, 
“Taiwan Gratified by SA’s Stance,” The Citizen, 28 August 1996.  
6 Department of International Relations and Cooperation Archives (hereafter DIRCO), Folder 1/24/3, Office of 
the President, Media Release Attention: All Editors. ‘South Africa’s Relations with the Greater China Region’, 
27 November 1996.  
7 P. Fabricius, ‘Timing of Taiwan Decision a Surprise’, The Star, 28 November 1996, M. Makhanya, ‘Shock as 
Sa Dumps Taiwan for China’, The Star, 28 November 1996, R. Hartley, ‘Mandela Chooses his China’, Sunday 
Times, 1 December 1996. 
8 The NEC is the highest organ of the ANC. For clarification on its inherent powers, see ‘The National 
Executive Committee: Powers of the NEC’, http://www.anc.org.za/officials/national-executive-committee-0, 
Accessed 30 January 2018.  
9  For greater insight into the PAIA Act, see The PAIA Act. Last Modified 9 March 2001, 
http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/2000-002.pdf, Accessed 30 November 2017. 
10 C. Alden, "Solving South Africa's Chinese puzzle: Democratic foreign policy making and the ‘two Chinas’ 
question." South African Journal of International Affairs 5, no. 2 (1997), 83. 
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Aside from the decision’s importance in post-apartheid South Africa’s foreign policy, China 
has become South Africa’s largest trading partner, and as such, its position as a critically 
strategic and economic partner of South Africa cannot be understated or separated from its 
political significance to our country. 11  In order to understand the dynamics of this 
relationship we need to understand the origins, and how and why South Africa decided to 
diplomatically recognise the PRC. This research report thus aims to reveal previously 
underappreciated or neglected factors that influenced this foreign policy decision, some of 
which continue to shape the dynamics of the current relationship. Moreover, Nelson 
Mandela’s role in the foreign policy decision making process during his Presidency has often 
been relegated to the periphery and very little in-depth analysis of his involvement has 
occurred. This research report aims to address that and to show that whilst this was ultimately 
a process of collective decision making, his belief in the possibility of South Africa being 
able to attain dual recognition of both Chinas directly impacted the timing of the switch.  
 
The research report will commence with Chapter One’s overview of the literature, including 
the knowledge gaps and potential knowledge gains, the main research question and 
subsidiary questions, and the research methodology and data collection. Chapter Two will 
engage with the theories, chiefly foreign policy decision making models, and elite theory, 
highlighting limitations in adequately applying these models and theories to the diplomatic 
history and foreign policy decision making of South Africa’s ‘switch’. Chapter Three will 
serve as the focal point of this research report, that being South Africa’s China Decision. The 
utilisation of archival documentation and interviews aims to create a narrative that reveals 
just how consensus was built amongst dissension. Chapter Four will discuss the impact 
‘Chinese diplomacy’ had on the decision making process, through the memoirs of Qichen 
Qian and Loh I-Cheng, and Chinese media articles from the time. The Conclusion provides a 
summation of the decision, discussed in congruence with the various implications of this 
research as we celebrate the 20th anniversary of diplomatic relations.  
*** 
 
 																																																								
11 According to the most recent statistics available, China is both South Africa’s top exporting partner and top 
importing partner. For a breakdown of these figures see,  ‘South Africa: Trade Statistics: Trade Partners, Export 
and Import Partners’, https://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/south-africa/tradestats, Accessed 10 January 2018, 
and ‘South African Trade at a Glance: Most recent values: Trade Summary’, 
https://wits.worldbank.org/CountrySnapshot/en/ZAF/textview, Accessed 10 January 2018.  
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Literature Review 
The Diplomatic Recognition Conundrum 
 
Given the apartheid government’s ties with the ROC, upon the ANC’s election as the ruling 
political party in South Africa in 1994 it was anticipated that a diplomatic switch to the PRC 
would occur momentarily. This did not happen, and as 1996 progressed and South Africa was 
nearing its third year without an official announcement, there was confusion as to why South 
Africa had not severed its diplomatic ties with the ROC. This perplexity was exacerbated by 
the increased awareness that President Mandela was attempting to achieve what no other 
country had – dual recognition of both Chinas. Literature from the time indicates that whilst 
it had become apparent that the recognition of the PRC was inevitable, scholars and 
journalists alike diverged on the viability of the PRC accepting South Africa’s pursuance of 
dual recognition.  
 
The Viability of Dual Recognition? 
Within the literature, there are some who believe that South Africa was capable of pursuing a 
balancing act between the rivals on either side of the Taiwan Strait.12 Their arguments for 
dual recognition centred around accounts of Taiwan’s purported economic importance to 
South Africa whereby the ROC had contributed to both the monetary and non-monetary 
sectors of the economy. In particular, Daniel (1995) surmised: 
As a developing, capital-importing economy, the PRC cannot match this type and level of 
involvement in the South African economy…individuals in banking and business circles 
maintain that South Africa’s short-term economic interests would be damaged by a change in 
its diplomatic position over China.13 
However, figures accompanying these claims related solely to the ROC, and not the PRC, 
limiting comparisons and undermining the validity of their argument.14     																																																								
12 In particular, the following scholars encouraged the pursuance of dual recognition. W. Breytenbach, "The 
Chinese dilemma: dual recognition is the ultimate solution." South African Journal of International Affairs 2, 
no. 1 (1994): 50-61; J. Daniel, ‘One China or two? South Africa’s Foreign Policy Dilemma’, The Taiwan 
Experience: Implications for South Africa (Johannesburg: The Consulate-General of the Republic of China, 
1995), 157-174; D. Geldenhuys, South Africa and the China Question: A Case for Dual Recognition. Vol. 6. 
East Asia Project (EAP), Dept. of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand, 1995; T. Sono, ‘The 
Case for Dual Recognition’, in South Africa and the two Chinas Dilemma, ed. by SAIIA Research Group 
(Johannesburg: SAIIA and Foundation for Global Dialogue, 1995), 72-80. 
13 J. Daniel, ‘One China or two? South Africa’s Foreign Policy Dilemma’, The Taiwan Experience: Implications 
for South Africa (Johannesburg: The Consulate-General of the Republic of China, 1995), 160.  
14 In contrast, Havenga (1995) provided a much more balanced economic perspective that concluded the PRC’s 
growing economic importance to South Africa, which will be referred to in more detail further on in this 
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In addition to this economically-based argument, other factors given by those who were 
adamant that dual recognition was achievable included references to the PRC’s human rights 
record.15 Given the ‘new’ South Africa’s emphasis on human rights in the post-apartheid era, 
and the Constitution and Bill of Rights that was being drafted at the time, the issue of 
potentially recognising Beijing included debates regarding “power versus principle” and 
South Africa’s “national interest”.16 Likewise, the ANC’s electoral manifesto had included 
emphasis on human rights and democracy as the basis of South Africa’s foreign policy going 
forward.  
 
Another factor was the notion of ‘South African exceptionalism’.17 Breytenbach (1994) and 
Geldenhuys (1995), especially, argued that President Mandela should use his “unique 
prestige” in the international realm in order to achieve dual recognition.18 Mandela was 
regarded as a leader that acted in benevolent, measured ways. Thus, his initial insistence on 
achieving a ‘two-China policy’ was not uncharacteristic, in fact, it rather affirmed the type of 
thinking he was renowned for, later referred to as ‘Madiba Magic’. The belief that if anyone 
could succeed in acquiring the PRC’s acceptance of dual recognition, it would be Mandela, 
was further propelled with the knowledge that he favoured dual recognition.19  
 																																																																																																																																																																												
chapter. See M. Havenga, ‘The Dilemma of the two Chinas: An Economic Perspective’, in South Africa and the 
two Chinas Dilemma, ed. by SAIIA Research Group (Johannesburg: SAIIA and Foundation for Global 
Dialogue, 1995), 32-46.   
15 Supposedly, the issue of human rights was placated with reassurances that “these and other issues would have 
to wait for the establishment of full relations.” See G. Mills, "The case for exclusive recognition." South Africa 
and the Two Chinas dilemma, ed. by SAIIA Research Group (Johannesburg: SAIIA and Foundation for Global 
Dialogue, 1995), 255.  
16 J. P. Barber, Mandela's world: the international dimension of South Africa's political revolution 1990-99 
(James Currey Publishers, 2004), 114, and C. Alden, "Solving South Africa's Chinese puzzle: Democratic 
foreign policy making and the ‘two Chinas’ question." South African Journal of International Affairs 5, no. 2 
(1997), 84.  
17 For a more thorough analysis of the notion of ‘South African exceptionalism’ see N. Lazarus, "The South 
African ideology: The myth of exceptionalism, the idea of renaissance." The South Atlantic Quarterly 103, no. 4 
(2004), 607-628.  
18 W. Breytenbach, "The Chinese dilemma: dual recognition is the ultimate solution." South African Journal of 
International Affairs 2, no. 1 (1994): 50-61, and D. Geldenhuys, South Africa and the China Question: A Case 
for Dual Recognition. Vol. 6. East Asia Project (EAP), Dept. of International Relations, University of the 
Witwatersrand, 1995. 
19 Some scholars concluded that comments made by Mandela indicated his loyalty to the ROC, and thus the 
need to pursue dual recognition. These comments were vis-à-vis the investments given to the ANC by the ROC 
for the 1994 election campaign, see J. Spence, "The debate over South Africa's foreign policy." South African 
Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 (1996), 118-125. Other examples of Mandela’s assurances to 
retain relations with the ROC include Sapa-Reuter, ‘Mandela Reaffirms Ties with Taiwan,’ The Star, 25 April 
1995, Sapa-AFP, ‘Taiwan Connection: Still Firm Friends,’ The Daily News, 4 July 1996, and SAPA-AFP, 
“Taiwan Gratified by SA’s Stance,” The Citizen, 28 August 1996.  
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This view of South Africa’s supposed “special status”20 seemed to confuse South Africa’s 
international standing and popularity at the time with “its relatively insignificant economic 
and political power in the world”.21 Some scholars recognised this and cautioned against 
propelling this “exceptionalism”.22 This was uncomfortably emphasised during President 
Nelson Mandela’s visit to England in July 1996, when meetings with the UK business 
community ultimately demonstrated that South Africa “should no longer rely on reputation 
alone as a guarantee of international goodwill and investor confidence”.23  Those that were 
sceptical, and more realistic about the prospects of dual recognition, regarded the psychology 
of this argument as the height of hubris. Indeed, whilst dual recognition would have been 
ideal, the arguments above were fundamentally flawed in how they overestimated South 
Africa’s clout and simultaneously underestimated the PRC’s unwavering stance on dual 
recognition.  
 
The Inevitability of Exclusive Recognition of the PRC 
The majority of scholars and journalists understood that the PRC would not entertain dual 
recognition. 24  25  Beijing viewed, and continues to view itself as the sole legitimate 
government of all of China, and Taiwan as a renegade province. Grant (1995) elaborated on 
this, explaining that it came to “the question of national unity and territorial integrity on 
which China will never compromise at any cost”.26 This emphasis on adhering to PRC’s 
refusal to compromise or tolerate a dual recognition policy is explored further in Barber 																																																								
20 J. P. Barber, Mandela's world: the international dimension of South Africa's political revolution 1990-99 
(James Currey Publishers, 2004), 107. 
21 H. M. Mallane, "South Africa and the Two Chinas Dilemma The South African Institute of International 
Affairs and the Foundation for Global Dialogue." South African Journal of International Affairs 3 (1996), 192. 
22 N. Lazarus, "The South African ideology: The myth of exceptionalism, the idea of renaissance." The South 
Atlantic Quarterly 103, no. 4 (2004), 607-628. 
23 J. Spence, "The debate over South Africa's foreign policy." South African Journal of International Affairs, 
Vol. 4, Iss. 1 (1996), 120.		
24 For greater insight into the arguments of those advocating for exclusive recognition of the PRC, see E. Andor, 
"South Africa’s Foreign Relations, 1996: A Bibliographical Chronology’." South African Yearbook of 
International Affairs (1995); R. L. Grant, "An international opinion on the recognition issue." South Africa and 
the Two Chinas dilemma, ed. by SAIIA Research Group (Johannesburg: SAIIA and Foundation for Global 
Dialogue, 1995); H. M. Mallane, "South Africa and the Two Chinas Dilemma The South African Institute of 
International Affairs and the Foundation for Global Dialogue." South African Journal of International Affairs 3 
(1996), 190-192; G. Mills, "The case for exclusive recognition." South Africa and the Two Chinas dilemma, ed. 
by SAIIA Research Group (Johannesburg: SAIIA and Foundation for Global Dialogue, 1995); J. Spence, "The 
debate over South Africa's foreign policy." South African Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 (1996), 
118-125; and R. Suttner, "Dilemmas of South African foreign policy: The question of China." South Africa and 
the two Chinas dilemma, (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs and the Foundation of 
Global Dialogue 1995).   
25 Additionally, by 1995, there was far greater diplomatic recognition and support for the PRC internationally, 
with 159 states recognising China, in comparison to the 29 that recognised Taiwan. 
26  R. L. Grant, "An international opinion on the recognition issue." South Africa and the Two Chinas 
dilemma, ed. by SAIIA Research Group (Johannesburg: SAIIA and Foundation for Global Dialogue, 1995).	
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(2004), where it is explained how Beijing made it quite clear that “there was only one China: 
the PRC” and that “Taiwan was part of it and would in time be fully reintegrated into it.”27 
The PRC’s insistence on its official recognition was further reiterated when it severed ties 
with Burkina Faso, Nicaragua, Grenada, Gambia, and Senegal when they tried to retain 
diplomatic relations with both the PRC and the ROC.28 Every state in the international system 
had to make a choice between recognising the PRC or the ROC. Thus, whilst dual 
recognition may have been preferred, it was ultimately not an option that the PRC would 
agree to.  
 
Apart from the PRC’s view on dual recognition, the issue of international pressure was 
central to arguments in favour of exclusive recognition of the ROC. Prior to the ending of 
apartheid, South Africa and Taiwan had found common-ground in international isolation, 
both being labelled as ‘pariah states’. However, with the ending of apartheid and the 
emergence of a democratic South Africa, South Africa’s foreign policy placed great emphasis 
on the importance of re-entering the international realm. This emphasis was regarded as 
South Africa pursuing a foreign policy that “fundamentally cleaves to the neo-liberal 
international consensus on the structure of the international system”.29 Consequently, the 
PRC’s ‘veto’ power as one of the permanent five in the UN’s Security Council was argued to 
have affected South Africa’s decision, given the realisation that South Africa could not afford 
to not recognise and establish diplomatic ties with the PRC because of South Africa’s hopes 
of obtaining a seat in the UN Security Council. South Africa thus required the support of the 
PRC, support that the PRC had made clear was contingent on South Africa abandoning any 
ideas of a ‘two China policy’.30  
 
Aside from the PRC being a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it was 
recognised by the OAU, the Commonwealth and the NAM.	Additionally, in 1995, the PRC 																																																								
27 J. P. Barber, Mandela's world: the international dimension of South Africa's political revolution 1990-99 
(James Currey Publishers, 2004), 106. For greater insight into the PRC’s resolute stance on the One China 
policy see J. K. Fairbank, and M. Goldman. China: A New history (The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1992), 235-256, and 331-341. For insight into the contrary, that of the Taiwanese identity, see J. Fenby, 
“The Penguin history of modern China: The fall and rise of a great power, 1850-2009” (Penguin UK, 2009), 
662-3, and 668-9. 
28 G. Mills, "The case for exclusive recognition." South Africa and the Two Chinas dilemma, ed. by SAIIA 
Research Group (Johannesburg: SAIIA and Foundation for Global Dialogue, 1995), 166.  
29 C. Alden, "Solving South Africa's Chinese puzzle: Democratic foreign policy making and the ‘two Chinas’ 
question." South African Journal of International Affairs 5, no. 2 (1997), 92. 
30 J. P. Barber, Mandela's world: the international dimension of South Africa's political revolution 1990-99 
(James Currey Publishers, 2004), 107.  
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was a member of most international multilateral organisations to which South Africa 
belonged, including the IAEA and other “specialised agencies”.31 Consequently, it was seen 
as contradictory for South Africa to belong to these international bodies without officially 
recognising the PRC, yet still maintaining ties with the ROC and claiming to be in pursuit of 
dual recognition, which to the PRC equated to ‘no recognition’. Thus, dual recognition was 
ultimately not an option that would be in the overall interest of South Africa’s desire to 
increase its international standing in the post-apartheid era.  
 
In addition to the PRC’s stance on dual recognition and the role of international pressure, the 
economic prospectus of the PRC was argued by scholars to be an important factor in 
recognising the PRC. In 1995, the ROC was South Africa’s greater trading partner, as 
indicated in the table below, accounting for 3,1% of South Africa’s total trade in comparison 
with the PRC’s 1,3%.  However, when the fact that the PRC had a greater population size and 
an economy larger than the ROC, along with the figures indicating the trade growth between 
South Africa and the PRC between 1989 and 1994, it was clear that trade with the PRC had 
grown significantly faster than with the ROC.32 
 
Furthermore, when figures were examined in conjunction with trade with Hong Kong, the 
trading totals exceeded that of the ROC. This was important given Hong Kong’s imminent 																																																								
31 R. Suttner, "Dilemmas of South African foreign policy: The question of China." South Africa and the two 
Chinas dilemma, (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs and the Foundation of Global 
Dialogue 1995), 4. 
32 For a detailed economic analysis of why South Africa needed to recognise the PRC see M. Havenga, ‘The 
Dilemma of the two Chinas: An Economic Perspective’, in South Africa and the two Chinas Dilemma, ed. by 
SAIIA Research Group (Johannesburg: SAIIA and Foundation for Global Dialogue, 1995), 32-46.   
33 This table has been compiled using the data presented in Havenga (1995). Havenga’s data was compiled using 
trade data captured by the SACU between 1989 to 1994. Whilst the combined trade figures of Hong Kong and 
the PRC did provide an indication of their potential importance to South Africa (over that of the ROC), Havenga 
did note that in doing so, three important factors are neglected – “First, many people have left Hong Kong over 
the last few years and many more may still leave, taking with them valuable skills. Secondly, Hong Kong 
produces various goods such as toys, clothes and electronic equipment that are also made in the PRC. This 
could lead to strong-inter-firm rivalry after unification. Finally, Hong Kong serves as a conduit for large 
volumes of trade between the ROC and the PRC. Such re-exports may distort the picture if the PRC and Hong 
Kong are simply aggregated. The effect of unification is therefore still unclear.”, 46.  
34 Rm indicates South African Rands in millions.   
South African Trade with the ROC, PRC, and Hong Kong (1994)33 
 Imports 
(Rm)34 
Exports 
(Rm) 
Total Trade 
(Rm) 
% of Total 
Imports 
% of Total 
Exports 
% of Total 
Trade 
ROC 2,573 1,704 4,277 3,5 2,7 3,1 
PRC 1,268 516 1,784 1,7 0,8 1,3 
Hong Kong 1,448 1,514 2,962 2,0 2,4 2,2 
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return to Chinese sovereignty in July 1997. The PRC had stressed that the status quo would 
not continue for countries that traded with Hong Kong but did not have full diplomatic 
recognition with the PRC, incentivising South Africa to establish exclusive diplomatic 
relations with the PRC “sooner rather than later”.  Aside from Hong Kong’s long-standing 
trade links with South Africa, South African Airways had landing rights in Hong Kong, and 
had used Hong Kong as a fuelling point during flights to various countries in Asia. Some 
scholars predicted that if South Africa did not recognise the PRC, the fallout would not only 
include trade being prohibited with Hong Kong, but could also include striping South African 
Airways of its landing rights in Hong Kong.35 
 
Additionally, Mills (1995) and Alden (1997) both mention Thabo Mbeki’s imminent 
succession as President of South Africa as a factor in delaying the switch. Whilst not 
explored in great detail in the literature, they argued that delaying the “inevitable” switch 
would make things more difficult for Mbeki, as he would then have to announce the China 
decision. By settling the China question before 1999, President Mandela “would himself 
assume responsibility” so that Mbeki “would not be burdened by this difficult problem”.36  
Moreover, Cornish (1997) explained that at the time of the debates regarding the issue of 
recognition, and the accompanying diplomatic ‘tug-of-war’, Mandela had already begun 
discussions with Mbeki about the handing over of the governance of the country. At the same 
time, Mbeki had avoided visits to the ROC, whilst also refraining from publicly commenting 
on the issue of recognition, “indicating that he was not planning to support the diplomatic 
status quo of the time”.37 Mandela hoped to succeed in obtaining dual recognition whilst 
Mbeki knew that the PRC would never accept this.  
 
Knowledge Gaps and Potential Knowledge Gains  
Whilst the above overview of the literature indicates that previous authors have competently 
examined the switch through the myriad of factors thought to have contributed to the 
decision, they were predominately based on available secondary sources. There has been very 
little primary evidence regarding the decision making process and the sequence of events vis-
à-vis the key actors who controlled ‘the switch’ decision. In particular, there has been an 																																																								
35 J. Daniel, ‘One China or two? South Africa’s Foreign Policy Dilemma’, The Taiwan Experience: Implications 
for South Africa (Johannesburg: The Consulate-General of the Republic of China, 1995), 165. 
36 C. Alden, "Solving South Africa's Chinese puzzle: Democratic foreign policy making and the ‘two Chinas’ 
question." South African Journal of International Affairs 5, no. 2 (1997), 90. 
37 J. J. Cornish, ‘New South Africa and China,’ South African Yearbook of International Affairs—1997 
(Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1997), 251.  
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absence of knowledge regarding the high-level exchange and communication that occurred in 
and amongst South Africa’s executive branch, the DFA, the ANC, and in particular the NEC. 
By analysing the archival documentation acquired from DIRCO and the ANC archives at 
Fort Hare, and by including excerpts from interviews with former DFA officials and NEC 
officials, this research report aims to provide a diplomatic history of the switch in 
recognition, and in doing so, fill these knowledge gaps.  
 
For the most part, the literature has also neglected an incorporation of Chinese and Taiwanese 
sources. There is very little cited in the way of publications produced in the PRC and the 
ROC. The acquisition of the memoirs of both PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and ROC 
Ambassador Loh I-Cheng will aid in greater inclusion of Taiwanese and Chinese 
perspectives, respectively, especially concerning the nature of ‘Chinese diplomacy’. The 
addition of Gary Lin’s thesis is an important contribution on the subject of the switch in 
diplomatic recognition given that Mr. Lin was working at the Taiwan Liaison Office 
Archives in Pretoria at the time of writing his thesis.38 By deepening the research through 
greater understanding of the PRC and ROC perspectives, this can perhaps aids the questions 
this research reports seeks to answer.  
 
Previous literature on the two Chinas dilemma has also disregarded the importance of the 
domestic situation between Beijing and Taipei, in particular, the cross-strait relationship at 
the time of the recognition issue. Following Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui’s controversial 
visit to the United States in June 1995, China responded to this perceived affirmation of 
Taiwan’s pursuance of independence by recalling their ambassador in Washington. They also 
deferred dialogue with Taiwan, and scheduled missile tests off the coast of Taiwan. In an 
attempt to emphasise the extent of their disapproval, a second round of military exercises, 
including more missile tests, were conducted near Taiwan in early 1996, before Taiwan’s 
presidential elections.39 Thus, the question of South Africa’s position regarding Taiwan, and 																																																								
38 G. Lin, ‘The Relations between the Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa’ (PhD thesis, 
University of Pretoria, Pretoria, May 2001). The Taiwan Liaison Office’s Archive in Pretoria is not open to the 
public and most of the documents are written in Taiwanese or Mandarin. They can only be accessed by the 
Taiwanese officials who are working there. Many of the old files have been sent back to Taipei for safe-keeping, 
and those archives will only be available for the general public after 30 or 35 years when they are declassified in 
accordance with Taiwanese regulations and laws governing official archives and documents. 
39 For a more thorough understanding of the cross-strait relationship between the PRC and the ROC during this 
period see N. Bernkopf Tucker, Strait talk: United States-Taiwan relations and the crisis with China (Harvard 
University Press, 2009), and N. Bernkopf Tucker, "China-Taiwan: US debates and policy choices." Survival 40, 
no. 4 (1998): 150-167. 
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increasing pressure to resolve the issue of recognition, coincided with escalating tensions 
across the Taiwan Strait, a factor not addressed in the literature. This provides a necessary 
contextualisation and will aid in understanding why the PRC became less patient with South 
Africa’s delay in switching diplomatic recognition.  
 
Research Questions  
The main question this research report seeks to answer is: 
What caused South Africa to switch diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China 
(ROC) to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in November 1996? 
 
Four subsidiary questions compliment the main question: 
1. What was the decision-making process and the corresponding sequence of events that 
guided the switch in diplomatic recognition? 
2. Who were the key actors controlling this process? 
3. What role did the NEC play?  
4. Why was the switch announced when it was? ***	
 
Research Methods and Data Collection 
 
Data Collection 
 
Archival Documentation  
The nature of this research report’s diplomatic history paradigm of the China decision 
requires a thorough examination of primary sources. The archival documentation was 
acquired through the administrative procedures stipulated by PAIA. Over 300 pages were 
retrieved from DIRCO, and 100 pages from the ANC Liberation Archives at Fort Hare 
University. This documentation includes official reports, policy statements, press releases, 
and speech transcripts, records of memoranda, official faxes, and personnel files. These were 
sorted and grouped in relevance according to date, subject matter, and the officials that had 
written the documents.   
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Limitations of Archival Documentation 
Whilst every effort was taken to acquire the entirety of the documentation pertaining 
to this case study, it became evident when interviewing officials that worked in the 
DFA and former members of the NEC, that certain documents were missing. This is 
unfortunately one of the limitations of archival research, particularly when access is 
restricted. Your research is at the mercy of the person granting permission for you to 
have access to the documentation you requested. By not relying solely on the archival 
documentation, and by utilising methods of triangulation, this report hopes to 
circumnavigate this.   
 
Interviews 
Access to interviews conducted by Christopher Williams aim to contribute greatly to the 
analysis of South Africa’s China decision.40  Interviews were arranged by Mr. Williams, and 
I was given permission to accompany him on some of the interviews, with the permission of 
the interviewees. Given that they were all former DFA officials or ANC/NEC members they 
were not considered ‘vulnerable subjects’.  
 
Limitations of Interviews 
The recollections of the interviewees are a product of their lived experiences and can 
be influenced by their ideals/positions/personal investments in the topic at hand. Also, 
they can be forgetful or simply remember certain events in a different light. Once 
again, every effort was taken to cross-check dates, events, names, and facts they may 
have been mentioned.  
 
Media Files 
Access to SABC’s Media Libraries afforded the opportunity to watch archived episodes of 
television broadcasts and interviews that included remarks made by President Mandela on the 
topic of the switch in recognition. These provided an opportunity to hear directly from the 
late president and to ascertain the environment at the time of the announcement i.e. in one 
clip the reactions from the journalists asking him questions spoke volumes about the many 
questions they had after his announcement of the switch in recognition.  																																																								
40 Christopher Williams is currently a PhD candidate for the Fletcher School at Tufts University, and a visiting 
lecturer at the University of Witwatersrand. Attached to this research report is a letter of permission from Mr. 
Williams for use of the interview data.  
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Limitations of Media Files 
Given these recordings are utilising older machinery certain parts were not always 
audible. By cross-checking articles from the time that quoted from the actual 
interview, any errors have hopefully been avoided.  
  
News Sources 
Newspaper articles and Op-Eds from the time period in question were gathered from Wits’ 
Database, in particular the SA Media database. These were grouped in accordance to their 
published date and aid in capturing the way in which the two China dilemma was reported 
and conveyed to the public. They provide a necessary contrast between the internal 
documents from DIRCO and Fort Hare, and indicate the discrepancies between what was 
communicated to the public and what was unknown.  
 
Limitation of News Sources  
Like any source, it is important to first question the motive and position of the author 
in question. For example, some of the Op-Eds were written by Ambassador Loh and 
thus would propel a certain ‘pro-ROC’ rhetoric when writing about the two China 
dilemma. Being cognisant of potential biases is crucial when tracing the narrative.    
 
Chinese and Taiwanese Sources 
Taiwanese and Chinese news reports from the time also provide an understanding of how 
South Africa’s decision making was perceived in Taipei and Beijing. Secondary sources 
including books and journal articles (both online and those found in Wits’ libraries and 
through inter-library loans) have also been incorporated. Memoirs of the key Chinese 
protagonists on either side of the Taiwan strait, the Foreign Minister of the PRC - Qian 
Qichen, and Loh I-Cheng, the ROC’s Ambassador to South Africa, have been used to 
supplement South African perspectives and inject the recollections of the recognition issue 
from the perspectives of Taipei and Beijing.  
 
Limitations of Chinese and Taiwanese Sources 
Mr. Loh’s memoir is not available in English and thus had to be translated. Mr. Hung-
ting Teng at Wits Language School helped tremendously with the translation from 
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Mandarin to English. Whilst every effort was made to ensure as accurate a translation 
as possible, mis-translations are unintentional yet possible.  
 
 
Methodological Application 
 
The incorporation of process-tracing and narrative analysis has taken guidance from the 
writings of Beach and Pedersen (2013), Bennett (2008), Collier (2011), George and Bennett 
(2005), and Waldner (2012).41 The use of process-tracing is particularly helpful in providing 
explanations for historical events and thus provides an important methodological framework 
though which to analyse South Africa’s China decision. In particular, Beach and Pedersen 
outlined three types of process-tracing: theory testing, theory building and explaining-
outcome. For this research report, explaining-outcome has been used given that the research 
question is case-centric rather than theory-centric. The questions this research report aims 
to answer and the subsequent findings will most likely be relevant only to the case of South 
Africa’s recognition of the PRC, and does not aim to generalise all historical instances of 
changes in diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC. The vast quantity of sources 
acquired does not afford this report the opportunity for a comparison study as doing so would 
be a disservice to the wealth of material that has not been previously consulted. This may be 
a limitation for those that seek to generate theories regarding the foreign policy decision 
making of switches in diplomatic recognition, or the foreign policy decision making under 
the Mandela administration. Whilst hoping to shed light on the latter, this research report 
aims to be case-centric as opposed to theory-centric. Once this research is complete it will 
afford the opportunity, perhaps a doctorate dissertation, where less space constraints can 
prompt an analysis of South Africa’s recognition dilemma with that of another country, or the 																																																								
41 D. Beach, and R. B. Pedersen, Process-tracing methods: Foundations and guidelines (University of Michigan 
Press, 2013); A. Bennett, "Process tracing: A Bayesian perspective." In (The Oxford Handbook of Political 
Methodology, 2008); D. Collier, "Understanding process tracing." PS: Political Science & Politics 44, no. 4 
(2011), 823-830; A. L. George, and A. Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. 
(MIT Press, 2005); and D. Waldner, "Process tracing and causal mechanisms," in H. Kincaid, ed, The Oxford 
Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science (Oxford University Press 2012), 65-84. 
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opportunity to analyse another South African foreign policy decision and decipher if there are 
correlations in the decision making process, the key actors controlling the process, etcetera.  
 
Prior engagement with literature regarding historical diplomacy also contributed to the 
methodological approach. In particular, the writings of Elman and Elman (1997), Levy 
(1997), and Haber, Kennedy, and Krasner (1997), were utilised to address the historical 
nature of this case study.42 In particular, Elman & Elman’s incorporation of narrative-based 
explanations as opposed to theory-based explanations, has guided the methodology.43 It is 
important to acknowledge that whilst these methodologies aim to best serve the case study in 
question, there are limitations to research that aims to deduce the very complexities inherent 
within a diplomatic switch in recognition particularly given, as George (1997) explained, 
“Much depends upon the sensitivity and judgment of the investigator in choosing the 
explanatory variables for purposes of arriving at an analytical explanation”. 44  A 
comprehensive triangulation of the sources acquired, and listed above, in addition to 
engagement and cognisance of their respective limitations, will hopefully prevent 
unsubstantiated analyses and conclusions. 
 
Chapter Two will engage with theories most suited to analysing a foreign policy decision, 
ultimately showing that current theories do not assist in explaining the outcome of this 
particular paradigm of the switch in recognition from the ROC to the PRC  
 
*** 		
  
																																																								
42 C. Elman, and M. F. Elman, "Diplomatic history and international relations theory: respecting difference and 
crossing boundaries." International Security 22, no. 1 (1997), 5-21, J. S. Levy "Too important to leave to the 
other: history and political science in the study of international relations." International Security 22, no. 1 
(1997), 22-33, and S. H. Haber, D. M. Kennedy, and S. D. Krasner, "Brothers under the skin: diplomatic history 
and international relations." International Security 22, no. 1 (1997), 34-43. 
43 C. Elman, and M. F. Elman, "Diplomatic history and international relations theory: respecting difference and 
crossing boundaries." International Security 22, no. 1 (1997), 7.  
44 E. I. George, and R. E. McCulloch, "Approaches for Bayesian variable selection." Statistica sinica (1997), 
339-373. 	
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Chapter Two 
 
Theoretical Engagement 		
When engaging with theory in relation to a foreign policy decision, like the switch in 
recognition from the ROC to the PRC, the most apt place to begin would be Foreign Policy 
Analysis (FPA). Numerous definitions exist regarding how to best encapsulate the study of 
foreign policy45  nonetheless, Sekhri’s (1995) definition continues to provided one of the 
most encompassing ones. FPA is defined as: 
a combination of diverse means and activities, which are dedicated to understanding and 
explaining foreign policy processes and the behaviour of significant actors in the international 
system.46  
Previous neo-realist discourses that dominated the study of International Relations have been 
extensively scrutinised, particularly in relation to the prominence they placed in the above-
mentioned ‘significant actors’ being equated to states and their behaviour. This state-centric 
emphasis disregarded the importance of utilising actor-centric theory, that which recognises 
that human decision-makers serve as the very ground of International Relations.47 There has 
been a continued shift away from state-centric approaches towards greater nuanced, actor-
centric approaches that realise that the role of humans in decision-making cannot be reduced 
to simply being unitary rational actors, nor can they be seen as equivalents to ‘the state’.48  
 
Correspondingly, Hudson (2013) surmised “that ‘the state’ is a metaphysical abstraction that 
is useful as a shorthand for IR’s ground, but cannot be a realistic conceptualisation of it.”49 
Thus, FPA can be seen as an ‘investigative process’, one that studies the behaviour and 
actions of human decision-makers that act alone or in groups in order to respond to their 
external environment on behalf of their respective states. Similarly, through this investigative 																																																								
45 For alternative definitions of FPA, see W. Carlsnaes, "The agency-structure problem in foreign policy 
analysis." International Studies Quarterly 36, no. 3 (1992), 245-270, B. White, "The European challenge to 
foreign policy analysis." European Journal of International Relations 5, no. 1 (1999), 37-66, M. Breuning, 
Foreign policy analysis: a comparative introduction (Springer, 2007).  
46 S. Sekhri, "The role approach as a theoretical framework for the analysis of foreign policy in third world 
countries." African Journal of Political Science and International Relations 3, no. 10 (2009), 423. 
47  V. M. Hudson, "Foreign policy analysis: actor‐specific theory and the ground of international 
relations." Foreign policy analysis 1, no. 1 (2005), 1-30. 
48 A notable exception includes Bell, Hindmoor, & Mols’ (2010) argument that “a state-centric relational 
account can help us to better understand important facets of persuasion as a mode of governance”, in S. Bell, A. 
Hindmoor, and F. Mols, "Persuasion as governance: A state‐centric relational perspective." Public 
Administration 88, no. 3 (2010), 851-870. 
49 V. M. Hudson, Foreign policy analysis: classic and contemporary theory (Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 4.  
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process of FPA, we are able to provide greater insight into how humans in governmental 
positions shape foreign policy decisions. Moreover, how this shaping influences the decisions 
they make on behalf on their states remains central in understanding that which happens in 
the international realm, further supporting Hudson’s (2013) argument that “The engine of 
theoretical integration in IR, then, is the definition of the situation created by the human 
decision-makers.”50  
 
Analysis of these situations created by human decision makers includes a variety of 
perspectives, theories, models and approaches, usually in relation to several actors such as the 
state, non-state and sub-state entities. Additionally, given the above-mentioned move away 
from state-centric notions, the individual level, the state level and the macro or systemic 
level 51  are further analysis proxies. Sekhri (2009) provided a comprehensive and yet 
extremely well-encapsulated inclusion of the diverse methods of FPA: 
This includes Decision-Making Approach, Roseau’s Pre-Theory, The Theory of 
Bureaucratic Politics with Allison’s models of (i) Rational Actor, (ii) Organisational 
Processes and (iii) Governmental/Bureaucratic Politics, Cognitivism, The notion of 
Cognitive Mapping, The concept of belief system, The Approach of Domestic Political 
Explanation, The notion of Two-level Games, Nested Games, The Role Approach, Discourse 
Analysis, Social Constructivism and so on.52  
 
In particular, when researching FPA models, Graham Allison’s ‘Essence of Decision’ (1971) 
remains one of the most widely cited on the subject. His proposed three models for 
interpreting and explaining American foreign policy, and in particular, the Cuban Missile 
Crisis have continued to be utilised. These models categorised decision-making into three 
distinct spheres: the Rational Actor Model; the Organisational Model; and the Bureaucratic 
Politics Model.53 These models ultimately explained foreign policy decisions as being the 
products of a process and not the outcome of values or ideology. Whilst the models have 
been used extensively in explaining foreign policy decision making, they have not been 
immune to criticisms. Specifically, the models place great emphasis on bureaucracies and 
organisations, and do not allow for the agency of individuals in the decision making process, 																																																								
50 V. M. Hudson, Foreign policy analysis: classic and contemporary theory (Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 9. 
51 For greater explanation of the three levels of analysis, see Waltz (1959), Singer (1961), and Carlsnaes (1992).  
52 S. Sekhri, "The role approach as a theoretical framework for the analysis of foreign policy in third world 
countries." African Journal of Political Science and International Relations 3, no. 10 (2009), 423.	
53 G. T. Allison, Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban missile crisis. No. 327.5 (729.1) (Little, Brown and 
Company, 1971). 
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nor for the impact of culture and national identity. These voids, especially the need for 
greater ‘actor specificity’, coined by Alexander George (1993), are addressed by Valerie 
Hudson (2013), who argued that: 
The single most important contribution of FPA to IR theory is to identify the point of 
theoretical intersection between the most important determinants of state behaviour: material 
and ideational factors. The point of intersection is not the state, it is human decision-makers.54 
 
Hudson’s emphasis on human decision-makers allows for an understanding that recognises 
the actors involved in the decision process as not being equivalent to the state. Ergo, the state 
itself is not an agent when analysing foreign policy decisions and “cannot be a realistic 
conceptualisation of it.”55 Whilst an in-depth analysis of all the aforementioned perspectives, 
theories, models and approaches is beyond the scope of this research report, the reason for its 
inclusion is to highlight the multitude of options that exist and are available in FPA. The 
following section of this chapter will explore one of FPA’s models, that of Foreign Policy 
Decision Making (FPDM).  
 
Foreign Policy Decision-Making (FPDM) “refers to the choices individuals, groups, and 
coalitions make that affect a nation’s actions on the international stage”.56 According to 
Renshon & Renshon (2008), these choices are usually the result of decisions that “are 
typically characterized by high stakes, enormous uncertainty, and substantial risk”. 57 
Although the importance of an actor-centric approach, discussed above, emphasised that 
decisions states make are shaped by individuals, in particular, leaders and members of 
executive branches, Mintz & DeRouen argued that it is crucial to view their role in 
conjunction with other contributing factors in the decision-making process. Mintz & 
DeRouen utilise four key determinants of foreign policy decisions: the Decision Environment 
(e.g. time and information constraints, dynamic and interactive settings), Psychological 
Factors (e.g. belief systems, leaders’ personality, and leadership style), International Factors 
(e.g. geopolitical location, deterrence and arms races, and alliances), and Domestic Factors 
																																																								
54 V. M. Hudson, Foreign policy analysis: classic and contemporary theory (Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 8. 
55 Ibid, 5.  
56 A. Mintz, and K. DeRouen Jr, Understanding foreign policy decision making. (Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 3.  
57 J. Renshon and S. Renshon (2008) in A. Mintz, and K. DeRouen Jr, Understanding foreign policy decision 
making. (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 3.  	
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(e.g. military and economic capabilities and interests, type of government, and role of public 
opinion).  
 
The Limitations of FPDM and the Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM) 
However, after initially analysing FPDM in relation to the archival documentation, the 
interviews, the news articles, the Op-Eds, the Taiwanese and Chinese memoirs, and the 
secondary literature gathered in the literature review, this research report concluded that 
FPDM’s applicability to the diplomatic recognition issue has its shortcomings. Specifically, 
FPDM is unable to adequately explain the intricacies of the switch in recognition, as it calls 
for four distinct categorisations (the decision environment, psychological factors, 
international factors, and domestic factors) thus reducing thorough analysis and neglecting 
the reality that many aspects of the decision making process are not easily categorised, and 
regularly overlap. For instance, the issue of Hong Kong’s return to the sovereignty of the 
PRC could fall under the first, third and fourth factors (the decision environment, the 
international factors, and the domestic factors). Furthermore, analysis of the archival 
documentation and interviews, as will be explored in greater detail in Chapter Three, 
indicates that there were key individuals who were at the forefront of the decision making, 
individuals within the NEC.  
 
This model does not account for the role of the NEC. From this insight it is clear that the 
FPDM model is unable to fully explain the political elite phenomenon in South Africa. 
Political elites play a very important role in the decision making process, a factor that is only 
accounted for in the BPM. This report questions why, as part of FPDM, does the BPM not 
allow for the exploration and analysis of political elites, such as the NEC? The above 
limitations of the FPDM model warranted research into other theories that could be utilised 
and that would perhaps best enable thorough theoretical engagement on the switch in 
diplomatic recognition.  
 
Political Elite Behaviour  
There are a number of conceptual lenses for understanding elite behaviour in the IR literature, 
including elite theory and the notion of “Big Men” Politics.  
 
 
	 29	
Elite Theory 
Elite theory, as defined by López (2013), “is based on the assumption that elite behavior has 
a causal relationship with general patterns of state–society relations”.58 The theory has 
predominately been applied to studies of American politics.59 The main arguments put forth 
from this research concerns the substantial impact that economic elites - individuals deemed 
to have substantial economic resources, and organised groups representing specific business 
interests have on U.S. politics and policy making, with average citizens and interest groups 
having comparatively little influence. However, the nature of the decision making process for 
the China recognition case study, as illuminated by the archival documentation and the 
interviews, indicates that the decision to recognise the PRC was ultimately the result of the 
inner-working, elite decision making of the NEC, thus those within the highest political organ 
of the NEC, and not necessarily individuals with substantial economic means. Upon 
examination, the applicability of elite theory to the case of the PRC’s recognition is faulty. 
The theory does not allow for an understanding of the power structures inherent within a 
collective like the NEC, and the influence its members had on the recognition issue.  
 
The work of Farazmand (1999) will also be drawn upon, given his critique of “the 
deficiencies of the traditional theories of organization premised on instrumental rationality 
and void of normative dimensions of politics and power structure”. 60  Given his 
encouragement for more normative dimensions, an exploration of Azeez and Ibukunoluwa 
(2015) is important. They provide an application of elite theory to the paradigm of Nigerian 
political elites. In particular, they explore how: 
the active participation of elites in a typical democratic system would be detrimental to the 
democratic process because the interest of the few would be taken care of thereby neglecting 
the interests and opinion of the general masses who are then seen as the “average citizen”.61  
 
Azeez and Ibukunoluwa explore the characteristics of these political elites explaining how 
they “have been seen to be sentimental, uncontrollably dependent, greedy or materialistic, 																																																								
58 López, Matias. "Elite Theory." Sociopedia.isa (2013). 
59 For greater insight into the incorporation of elite theory in analyses of American politics, see K. Prewitt, and 
A. Stone, The ruling elites: Elite theory, power, and American democracy (HarperCollins Publishers, 1973), 
M. Gilens, and B. I. Page, "Testing theories of American politics: Elites, interest groups, and average 
citizens." Perspectives on politics 12, no. 3 (2014), 564-581. 
60 A. Farazmand, "The elite question: Toward a normative elite theory of organization." Administration & 
Society 31, no. 3 (1999): 321.  
61 Azeez, A., and A. Ibukunoluwa. "Elite Theory and Elite Circulation in Nigerian Politics." International 
Journal of Banking, Finance, Management & Development Studies 3, no. 1 (2015), 153. 
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and in most cases non-nationalistic” factors which they argue have contributed to the 
underdevelopment of Nigeria, issues of political instability, and unfavourable changes in the 
country’s growth.62 They go on to explain that there are mediums within Nigerian politics 
which “foster or aids elite circulation” and identify these mediums as ‘godfatherism’, 
‘political parties’, and ‘economic contributors’.63 Unfortunately, much of what is spoken in 
their paper mirrors South Africa’s reality,64 yet the extent to which their analysis correlates 
with the recognition of the PRC is questionable. Given that the issue of recognition was a 
foreign policy decision, it was not a decision that was intended to be injected with the 
opinions of the wider citizenry. Even so, the research gathered has shown, from the new 
articles, Op-Eds, and academic conferences, that the role of public opinion featured in 
diplomatic exchanges pertaining to this foreign policy decision. 65  FPDM does not 
accommodate for the role of the public’s opinion. Furthermore, whilst Azeez and 
Ibukunoluwa’s paradigm of elite theory is important in the context of Nigeria, when we apply 
the same theory to the China decision, it does not necessarily offer an explanation for the 
NEC’s decision. The archival documentation and the interviews show that when the NEC 
finally reached consensus on recognition the PRC, it was due to South Africa’s best national 
interests. There is no evidence to suggest that certain individuals in the NEC would gain from 
the switch, in fact, as will become evident in Chapter Four, some individuals might have 
personally gained from rather retaining recognition of the ROC, given the ‘chequebook 
diplomacy’ openly utilised by the ROC.  
 
																																																								
62 Ibid, 155. 
63 Ibid. 
64 This is encapsulated in Prof. T. Madonsela’s, South Africa’s former Public Protector’s ‘State of Capture’ 
Report which details the investigation into “alleged improper and unethical conduct by the President and other 
state functionaries relating to alleged improper relationships and involvement of the Gupta family in the 
removal and appointment of Ministers and Directors of State-Owned Enterprises resulting in improper and 
possibly corrupt award of state contracts and benefits to the Gupta family’s businesses”, see Public Protector, 
‘State of Capture’, Report No: 6 of 2016/17, 14 October 2016, 
http://www.pprotect.org/sites/default/files/legislation_report/State_Capture_14October2016.pdf, Accessed 20 
February 2018.  
65 Diplomatic exchanges, or ‘chatter’, and its contribution to the decision making is particularly emphasised 
with the reaction that a September 1996 Xinhua Agency news article garnered. The report condemned President 
Mandela’s August 1996 reference to Taiwan as a country, see ‘Dual Recognition’ Unacceptable says People’s 
Daily’, Xinhua News Agency, 5 September 1996. The PRC’s anger to Mandela’s reference was included in a 
documented compiled by C. Basson at the DFA. This indicates the way in which public opinion did indeed 
reach the DFA. DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, C. Basson, ‘PRC Reaction to President Mandela’s Recent Statement on 
Continued Diplomatic Relations with the Republic of China’, 18 September 1996. 
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“Big-Men” Politics66 
When utilising process-tracing and data analysis in relation to the archival documentation and 
the interviews, it is evident that there were key individuals who impacted the timing of the 
switch in diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC. This is where theory focussed on 
“Big Men” politics, or elite individuals in Africa, may be able to shed some light.  
 
As Daloz (2003) identified, the trend of “Big Men”, or elites in Africa, has received little 
attention: 
Or more precisely, it has been a question of fitting the study of elites into very reductive 
schematic moulds, even if this has meant twisting the realities a little for general coherent 
explanation” … and that “reflections on the elites still appear only at the margin of wider 
theoretical syntheses”.67  
Whilst Sahlin’s “Big Man” model was initially intended to explain the conversion of 
resources (e.g. money) for another resource (e.g. political support), Daloz (2003) referred to 
“Big Men” as those “controlling as many fields of activities and networks as possible”, and a 
model that “applies to all types of elites including other important categories in sub-Saharan 
Africa, like “traditional rulers,” some religious and even top military leaders”.68  One of the 
critiques offered by Daloz is of particular importance to this research report. When analysing 
the neo-Marxist approach in dependency theories, he argued that “we seldom find an 
empirically grounded reflection on cleavages and intra-struggles within the elite”.69 This 
acknowledgement that “Big Men” do not operate as one homogenous group resounds with 
what has been discovered amongst the archival documentation and during the interviews. The 
theory of the “Big Man” offers a departure from elite theory in that it “seems the more 
relevant for acknowledging, on the one hand, the close relationship between communities or 
factions and elites representing them and, on the other hand, the weak differentiation of the 
elites”.70 These social-political overlaps, along with the acknowledgement of intra-party 
contestations is evident through the intra-party dissension within the ANC’s NEC, in relation 																																																								
66 The “Big Men” theory or “Big Man” model was originally an anthropological model introduced by Marshall 
Sahlins. See his work M. D. Sahlins, "Poor man, rich man, big-man, chief: political types in Melanesia and 
Polynesia." Comparative studies in society and history 5, no. 3 (1963), 285-303. 
67 J-P. Daloz,"" Big men" in sub-Saharan Africa: how elites accumulate positions and resources." Comparative 
sociology 2, no. 1 (2003), 271, 272, and 277.  
68 Ibid, 271. Daloz further identified how the notion of elites or “Big Men” in Africa has been addressed through 
other theories and approaches namely, the development and modernisation theories of the 1960s, the neo-
Marxist dependency approaches of the 1970s and the ‘so-called’ “third wave” of African studies from the 
1980s.  
69 Ibid, 274. 
70 Ibid, 277. 
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to the ‘Two China’ issue. The ideological pasts and opinions of some of the individuals 
highlight the socio-political linkages inherent in political elite circles.71 FPDM does not 
accommodate for intra-party dissension and is thus limited in understanding the lack of initial 
dissension on the ‘Two China’ issue.  
 
The Limitations of Elite Theory and “Big Men” Politics 
Yet, whilst the archival documentation and interviews with former officials indicates the vital 
role of certain individuals, as will be explored in the following Chapter Three and Chapter 
Four, when applying the “Big Men” politics theory to the foreign policy decision case study 
of South Africa’s China decision, there is little resonance with the current literature. Thus, 
even in combination these theories do not adequately explain what is observed through the 
archival documentation and the interviews, which is political elite interaction at the domestic 
level and at the diplomatic level. There is a gap in explaining the decision making process 
that the current models do not account for; how the decision was actually reached through a 
process from dissension to consensus.  
 
Current elite behaviour theories focus on elite formation,72 colonial legacies,73 patronage,74 
kleptocracy,75 and domestic politics.76 These do not explain the interaction this research 
report develops– in particular, the overlap between domestic and foreign politics. Whilst this 
research report is not attempting to theory build, it is attempting to explain an outcome that 
the current theory is unable to assist with. It is hoped that future theory building concerning 
South Africa’s political elite interactions across the diplomatic circle could perhaps benefit 
from this paradigm of South Africa’s China decision. Chapter Three will substantiate theses 
																																																								
71 The influence of ideology within the NEC is particularly evident through P. Jordan’s interview where he 
explained how those that had been in exile in the USSR, and those that had been in exile in the PRC, had, at 
times, divergent views on the China issue. Those that had been in China were more vocal about the need to 
recognise the PRC given that they understood more about the national integrity intertwined with the ‘One 
China’ policy. P. Jordan, interview by C. Williams. Johannesburg, 14 March 2017. 
72 V. T. Le Vine, "Political elite recruitment and political structure in French-speaking Africa." Cahiers d'études 
africaines 8, no. Cahier 31 (1968), 369-389. 
73 I. Baba, "Elites and exclusive politics in Sub-Saharan African." African Journal of Political Science and 
International Relations 8, no. 8 (2014): 271-274. 
74 J-P. Daloz,"" Big men" in sub-Saharan Africa: how elites accumulate positions and resources." Comparative 
sociology 2, no. 1 (2003), 271-285. 
75 J. D. Kandeh, Jimmy D. "Ransoming the state: Elite origins of subaltern terror in Sierra Leone." Review of 
African Political Economy 26, no. 81 (1999), 349-366. 
76  Nyamnjoh, Francis, and Michael Rowlands. "Elite associations and the politics of belonging in 
Cameroon." Africa 68, no. 3 (1998): 320-337. 	
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theoretical limitations that have been discussed by detailing how South Africa’s China 
decision was made.  
 
*** 
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Chapter Three   
South Africa’s China Decision: Building Consensus Amongst Dissension 
 
This chapter serves as the focal analysis of this research report’s topic of South Africa’s 
China decision. It does so by bringing together the vast archival documentation, interviews, 
news articles and Op-Eds from the time of the decision, so as to piece together the narrative 
of how the decision played out. In utilising these sources, this exploration aims to answer the 
main question that this research report set out to answer; ‘What caused South Africa to switch 
diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China (ROC) to the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) in November 1996?’, and the four subsidiary questions; ‘What was the decision-
making process and the corresponding sequence of events that guided the switch in 
diplomatic recognition?’, ‘Who were the key actors controlling this process?’, ‘What role did 
the NEC play?’, and ‘Why was the switch announced when it was?’. This is done in the hopes 
of not only understanding the diplomatic history paradigm of the China decision but to aid 
future theoretical constructions concerning foreign policy analysis of foreign policy decision 
making under the Mandela administration.  
 
The Evolution of Sino-African Relations: Bandung Conference, and the Non-Aligned 
Movement 
The PRC has had a long history of supporting Africa, and its most ardent engagement with 
African states can be traced to the Bandung Conference, and the formation of the NAM. 
These progressions amongst Africa and Asia showed growing consensus amongst 
‘developing’ countries that the Western hegemonic world order did not place great concern 
on the development of Africa and Asia, and thus there was an urgent need for greater ‘South-
South’ cooperation.77  
 
The conference produced a Peace Declaration of 10 points that reiterated some of the 
principles from the UN Charter. 
 
1. Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the charter 
of the United Nations 
																																																								
77 J. Grieco, G. John Ikenberry, and M. Mastanduno. Introduction to international relations: Enduring questions 
and contemporary perspectives (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 59. 
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2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations78 
3. Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small 
4. Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another 
country 
5. Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself, singly or collectively, in conformity 
with the charter of the United Nations 
6. (a) Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve any particular 
interests of the big powers  
(b) Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries 
7. Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any country 
8. Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, 
conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the 
parties own choice, in conformity with the charter of the United Nations 
9. Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation 
10. Respect for justice and international obligations79 
 
The Bandung Conference, along with the creation of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) and 
the New International Economic Order (NIEO) arguably signified a historic moment of 
divergence in global politics. The ‘banding together’ of the ‘developing’ drew scepticism 
from Western states that were concerned with the power of this grouping. Furthermore, these 
shifts in the global arena indicated the expansion of China’s regional power – an unsettling 
reality for Western hegemony with their views impelling the necessity for the containment of 
communism, but a welcomed opportunity for China’s engagement with other developing 
countries. In particular, South Africa would come to benefit greatly from China’s expansion 
during the liberation struggle.  
 
 																																																								
78 The bolded points highlight those that would become contentious during the China dilemma, in particular 
those relating to matters of territorial integrity, and respect of international obligations. Whilst none of the 
archival documents, secondary literature or interviewees made specific references to these exact principles, it is 
arguable that this thinking of ‘South-South’ cooperation, and the need to honour international obligations guided 
the China decision. Specifically, this was emphasised during Mandela’s 27th November announcement when he 
stated that “In its international relations, South Africa has become an active participant within the ambit of the 
OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement as well as within the UN system.  A permanent continuation of diplomatic 
recognition of the Republic of China, or Taiwan, is inconsistent with South Africa’s role in international 
affairs.” Quoted in M. Makhanya, ‘Shock as SA Dumps Taiwan for China’, The Star, 28 November 1996. 
79 C.J. Lee. "AT THE RENDEZVOUS OF DECOLONIZATION: The Final Communiqué of the Asian-African 
Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, 18–24 April." Interventions 11, no. 1 (2009), 81-93. 
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The PRC’s Support of the Anti-Apartheid Struggle 
China’s expansion into Africa altered the notion that only the PRC could benefit from Africa, 
and not the other way around.80 However, South Africa had already known this given the 
support its liberation movement had received. Ties with the ANC had existed as early as the 
1950s when Walter Sisulu had travelled to the PRC to request military support for the 
struggle against the apartheid regime. Although Sisulu was unable to obtain weapons for the 
ANC, he was well received.81 A decade later, Yusuf Dadoo and Vella Pillay visited China on 
behalf of the SACP and garnered great support from the PRC.82 The following year, in 1961, 
Raymond Mhlaba and a group of Umkhonto we Sizwe recruits received secret military 
training in China.83 Furthermore, between 1962 and 1963, many ANC and SACP officials 
were welcomed in China, including J.B. Marks, Joe Slovo, and Oliver Tambo.84  
 
The close relationship between the PRC and the ANC was explained by Max Sisulu who 
indicated how there were two main reasons for this: 
One was that they supported our struggle and also we were inspired by the struggle of other 
peoples in other countries who won their freedom, and China’s one of those very big 
countries, huge population, and who were able to do two things first liberate themselves but 
also empower their own people.85  
The ANC was not only inspired by the political achievements of the PRC but saw how their 
developmental trajectory could perhaps be emulated to uplift the majority of the South 
African population that had experienced years of oppression: 
																																																								
80 Historically, literature concerning the relationship between China and South Africa was framed in terms of 
“imperialism”, “resource extraction” and “globalisation”, propelling variations of George Yu’s “the dragon in 
the bush” metaphor whereby “the dragon is imposing but the bush is dense” G. T. Yu, "Dragon in the bush: 
Peking's presence in Africa." Asian Survey 8, no. 12 (1968), 1026. See also D. Large, "Beyond ‘dragon in the 
bush’: the study of China–Africa relations." African Affairs 107, no. 426 (2008), 45-61 or, similarly, the “dance 
between the elephant and the dragon” in P. T. Zeleza, "Dancing with the dragon: Africa's courtship with 
China." The Global South 2, no. 2 (2008), 171.These inferences did little to dispel notions that Sino-South 
African relations were mutually beneficial, and instead propagated the idea that China’s role in Africa had 
benefitted China at the expense of African interests.  
81 E. Sisulu, Walter & Albertina Sisulu: In Our Lifetime (Claremont, South Africa: David Philip Publishers, 
2002), 112. 
82 V. Padayachee and J. Sender, ‘Vella Pillay: Revolutionary Activism and Economic Policy Analysis’, Journal 
of Southern African Studies, 44: 1 (2018), 154-155. 
83 S. Ellis, External Mission: The ANC in Exile, 1960-1990 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 12-13 
and 27-29, and R. Mhlaba, Raymond Mhlaba’s Personal Memoirs, narrated to T. Mufamadi (Pretoria and 
Robben Island: HSRC Press and Robben Island Museum, 2001), 115.   
84 Z. Weiyun and X. Sujiang, ‘China's Support for and Solidarity with South Africa Liberation Struggle’, in 
South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET), ed., The Road to Democracy in South Africa, 3, 2, (Cape 
Town: Zebra Press, 2008), 1221-1224. 
85 M. Sisulu, interview by C. Williams, Johannesburg, 28 February 2017. 
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In China everybody was in the ‘Mao suits’ and standard of living wasn’t that high. When I 
went back, what, five year later, first time everybody was on a bicycle, they love bicycles, I 
went back five years later and there were no bicycles only cars. It says a lot actually about the 
quality of life of the people. So, we were always being inspired by the achievements of, you 
know, China had a huge population in a historically short space of time. But also, we 
benefited from the support we got from the People’s Republic of China. My father was there 
and spoke to us about China when we were kids, and so we liked the idea that, basically, a 
peasant population could, in a historically short space of time, could do what the Chinese 
were able to do. And I think what impressed us most was the education system. Educating 
millions of people. So that was really outstanding for us. And every time you go to China you 
see the qualitative improvement in the lives of the people…the quality might not be the same 
as say America or anywhere else in Europe, but at least people have a roof over their head, 
and they have food.86  
 
The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Split 
Whilst the ties had initially been strong, the Sino-Soviet split saw the SACP siding with the 
Soviet Bloc, and relations between the SACP and the CCP deteriorated. Given the SACP’s 
alliance with the ANC, and the USSR’s support of the ANC, the ANC distanced itself from 
the CCP,87 and the PRC responded by transferring its support to the PAC in the late 1960s 
and early into the 1970s.88  South Africa’s liberation movements appeared to have to choose, 
and as Zola Skweyiya, who at the time was a member of MK and staying in one of the camps 
in Moscow, recalled, ‘The main tendency was that you must support what Moscow is 
saying.’ Sisulu too, when asked if the split forced the ANC to choose between the PRC and 
USSR, responded: 
Yes, and no, the split had an effect on not just the ANC but the international implication 
obviously, we got a lot of support also from Russia, that Soviet Bloc…but we continued to 
receive a lot of support from China even though there was this tension we, from time to time 
we got material support from China and obviously the political support was always there. It 
was not in question because it was a moral issue, it was a political issue, so we continued to 
receive political support from China.89 
 
																																																								
86 M. Sisulu, interview by C. Williams, Johannesburg, 28 February 2017. 
87 Z. Weiyun, and X. Sujiang, China’s Support for and Solidarity with South Africa’s Liberation Struggle’. in 
The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Vol. 3, Part 2, (Cape Town: Zebra Press), 1216.  
88 A. Pahad, interview by C. Williams, Johannesburg, 7 March 2017. 
89 M. Sisulu, interview by C. Williams, Johannesburg, 28 February 2017. 
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Yet, Sisulu was quick to point out that the split was viewed differently, although within the 
ANC there was an understanding of maintaining ties with both the PRC and USSR:  
Well, there would be different views, depending on who you talk to. When there was a split, a 
big split between the Soviet Union and China, and of course that influenced a lot of people, 
we as the ANC were very close to the Soviet Union and they continued to support us, I 
studied there myself, so clearly we have bias depending on who you talk to. But the support 
we got from the Soviet Union was much greater than the support which we got from China, 
materials scholarships, and that kind of thing. And also, the Soviet Union was a big country, 
politically a superpower, but we always, as the ANC, wanted to make sure that we didn’t lose 
a friendship because of others. The Chinese Revolution was also a source of inspiration for us 
because it was the peasants of the country, and the speed in which China changed itself was 
amazing so we used to encourage people to go to China and learn from the Chinese because 
there’s always something to learn from everybody, and the Chinese Revolution peasants 
were, at the time, a source of inspiration.90  
 
Even with the Sino-Soviet split, China did remain loyal to the anti-apartheid struggle and 
backed the UN’s call for sanctions against the apartheid government. This was further 
evident between December 1963 and February 1964, when then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai 
visited 10 African countries and emphasised Chinese support for the liberation movements. 
During the visit he gave five guiding principles for China's relations with Africa.  
‘The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence’91: 
1. China supports the African and Arab peoples in their struggle to oppose 
imperialism and old and new colonialism and to win and safeguard national 
independence  
2. It supports the pursuance of a policy of peace, neutrality and non-alignment by the 
governments of African and Arab countries 
3. It supports the desire of the African and Arab peoples to achieve unity and 
solidarity in the way they themselves choose 
4. It supports African and Arab countries in their efforts to settle their disputes through 
peaceful consultations.  
5. It holds that the sovereignty of African and Arab countries should be respected by all 
other countries and encroachment and interference from any quarter should be opposed  
 																																																								
90 M. Sisulu, interview by C. Williams, Johannesburg, 28 February 2017.	
91 The Secretariat of the Chinese Follow-up Committee of The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 2015, 129-
130.  
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Whilst South Africa was not one of the 10 African countries that Premier Zhou Enlai visited, 
these principles are indicative of the moral imperative felt by the Chinese towards Africa.  
The reason South Africa had not been included as a stop in Premier Zhou’s visit to Africa 
was due to the fact that, at the time, South Africa did not have diplomatic relations with the 
PRC. 
 
The 1980s saw improvements between China and the USSR, which also improved the ties 
between the PRC and the ANC. The ANC sent high-level delegations to the PRC, where they 
were welcomed and given financial support for their cause.92 Pallo Jordan recounted how 
during one of the delegations, him and Aziz Pahad “came away with a briefcase full of US 
dollars”, which the two then took to the ANC’s headquarters in Lusaka.93 This support from 
the PRC continued into the 1990s, especially after the apartheid government unbanned the 
liberation movements.94  
 
The PRC and ROC’s ties with the apartheid government  
Even though the PRC increased its support of the anti-apartheid liberation movements, there 
is now substantial evidence that the PRC had connections with the apartheid government. In 
particular, the ties were centred around trade of food staples, metal, iron ore and even 
military equipment.95  It appears that the ANC was aware of how the PRC was ironically 
aiding the ability of the apartheid government to fight the liberation movements because in 
1994, their Department of International Affairs (DIA) released a press statement that 
condemned the PRC for violating the UN’s arms embargo against the apartheid 
government.96 
 
																																																								
92 I. Taylor, China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise (New York: Routledge, 2006), 136 – 138, and Z. 
Weiyun, and X. Sujiang, China’s Support for and Solidarity with South Africa’s Liberation Struggle’. in The 
Road to Democracy in South Africa, Vol. 3, Part 2, (Cape Town: Zebra Press), 1225 – 1227.   
93 P. Jordan, interview by C. Williams, Johannesburg, 14 March 2017. 
94 Z. Weiyun, and X. Sujiang, China’s Support for and Solidarity with South Africa’s Liberation Struggle’. in 
The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Vol. 3, Part 2, (Cape Town: Zebra Press), 1252. 
95 B. Seery, ‘Apartheid South Africa had secret dealings with Communist China, says businessman’, The 
Sunday Independent, 23 June 1996, and H. van Vuuren, Apartheid Guns and Money (Auckland Park, South 
Africa: Jacana Media, 2017), 390-392. van Vuuren’s research discovered that Armscor and the South African 
Defence Force (SADF) worked with a Chinese state-owned military producer, Norinco, to provide weapons to 
the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the Mozambican National Resistance 
Movement (RENAMO).  
96 ANC DIA press release, 11 November 1994, cited in T. Sono, ‘The Case for Dual Recognition’, in South 
Africa and the two Chinas Dilemma, ed. by SAIIA Research Group (Johannesburg: SAIIA and Foundation for 
Global Dialogue, 1995), 78. 
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The ROC’s ties to the apartheid government, whilst no less defensible, were certainly more 
transparent. As discussed during the literature review, given the international isolation they 
both experienced, trade relations between the ROC and South Africa were strong and covered 
an array of fields.97 By 1994, the ROC was South Africa’s seventh largest trading partner, 
accounting for 3,1% of its total trade.98 The ROC continued to support the apartheid 
government, even after the unbanning of the ANC. Their thoughts on the ANC were made 
clear in May 1990 when Jerry Matjila, the ANC’s representative in East Asia, applied for a 
visa to travel to Taiwan to lobby for election support (See Appendix 1 and 2). The ROC 
initially issued him a visa but later withdrew it, justifying their decision because of the ANC 
being a supposed “terrorist” organisation.99 (Ironically, less than two years later the ROC 
would send Aziz Pahad a letter intended for Mandela which stated “The Peoples republic 
[sic] of China will always support the ANC in its struggle for a democratic South Africa”. 
(See Appendix 3).  
 
The ROC’s U-turn 
Less than a year after the unfortunate reference to the ANC as a “terrorist” organisation, the 
ROC clearly realised the necessity of being in the good graces of the ANC, and in January 
1992, the ROC Ambassador to South Africa, Loh I-Cheng sent Mandela a letter confirming 
that the ROC would be granting 500 000 USD to the Albert Luthuli Memorial Trust, R1 000 
000 to the Phemelo Foundation, and sponsorship of training for ANC members that covered a 
range of fields. Loh also included his intention in “further cementing the good relations with 
your organisation and yourself.”100 Mandela was being exposed to the first of many instances 
of the ROC’s utilisation of ‘cheque book’ diplomacy, a tactic which will be explored in 
greater detail in Chapter Four.  
 
Just a few months later, in July 1992, the ROC’s Foreign Minister, Frederick Chien, extended 
an invitation to Mandela to visit Taiwan. The letter was laden with compliments to Mandela, 
with Minister Chien exclaiming; 																																																								
97 For a thorough description of ROC-RSA ties see Lin, ‘The Relations between the Republic of China and the 
Republic of South Africa’, and van Vuuren, Apartheid Guns and Money, 465-468. 
98 M. Havenga, 1995 “The Dilemma of the Two Chinas: An Economic Perspective”. South Africa and the two 
Chinas dilemma, SAIIA Research Group (1995), 35.  
99 UFH, NAHECS, Japan Mission, Box 6, File 16, ANC-Tokyo Office Press Release, ‘Taiwan Withdraws Visa 
for ANC Chief Representative to Japan’, 26 May 1990.  
100 UFH, NAHECS, Secretary General’s Office, Box 22, Folder 186, Letter from I-C. Loh to N. Mandela, 30 
January 1992. 
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For many years, we have watched with admiration your selfless sacrifice toward the goals of 
a free and democratic South Africa. Your release in February 1990 was a source of joy for us 
also. Even though the road toward a new constitution may not be all smooth, we are confident 
that the African National Congress under your astute leadership will succeed in the end.101 
Mandela thanked Minister Chien and confirmed that plans would be made for him to travel to 
the ROC in 1993.102 
 
Mandela’s First Trip to the PRC in October 1992 
Whilst plans were underway for Mandela’s ROC trip, a visit to the PRC had already been 
scheduled for October 1992. When asked by reporters in Beijing if the purpose of his visit 
was fundraising for the upcoming elections, Mandela did not respond directly but did surmise 
that “his mission had been successful in all respects.”103 An ANC report from the trip to the 
PRC confirms Mandela’s summation, explaining how, after a private meeting with the PRC 
Premier, Li Peng, Thomas Nkobi and Pallo Jordan,  “At the end of that private consultation 
Madiba came back to us and told us that he was pleased with the response of the Chinese 
Premier.”104 The response was indeed pleasing – The PRC had granted the ANC two million 
USD, three million for the ANC cadres in Tanzania, and five million credit to purchase goods 
from the PRC.105 
 
During his PRC trip, Mandela informed the PRC officials of his invitation to visit the ROC, 
and explained to Minister Qian that he would keep him informed about how the ANC would 
tackle the invitation.106 Qian also recalled this trip as an example of the conflict between the 
PRC and the ROC, detailing how Mandela’s trip created great anxiety for the Taiwanese. 
This is confirmed in Loh’s memoir, where he believed that the trip signalled that “the PRC 
has gained the leading position in the race.”107 This was, of course, not entirely inaccurate. 
ANC officials on the trip had made it clear that South Africa’s China decision would only 
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occur after the 1994 elections.108 Yet, Qian noted that Mandela had given PRC officials 
private reassurances that South Africa would definitely be recognising the PRC.109  
 
The Establishment of Reciprocal ‘Study Centres’ in 1992 
Also in 1992, the PRC and South Africa, still under the governance of the apartheid 
government, established reciprocal ‘Study Centres’ in their respective capitals. This worried 
the ANC, who had believed that the PRC would wait for their election as the ruling party, 
before establishing diplomatic relations.110 The PRC’s eagerness to establish diplomatic ties 
was evident through Qian’s recollection that South Africa “attached more importance to 
economic and trade relations and personnel exchanges with China than to political 
relations.”111 These sentiments were observed by Ambassador Loh who claimed that the PRC 
would have established diplomatic relations even prior to the first democratic elections.112		
Xie Zhiheng, the Director of the PRC’s Study Centre in Pretoria sent Thabo Mbeki a letter in 
December 1992, regarding Mandela’s upcoming visit to the ROC.113 The letter, a total of 
seven pages, emphasised the extent to which the PRC was concerned about the influence of 
the Taiwanese, and the future of their relations with South Africa. Not wanting to worry the 
PRC, in May 1993, another mission to the PRC was organised, with the sole intention of 
reassuring the PRC officials about Mandela’s trip to the ROC. Mbeki led the delegation, and 
minutes from the discussions indicate that he justified Mandela’s ROC trip as a decision 
made by the ANC’s NEC in order for Mandela to acquire the financial support that had been 
promised by the ROC.  Mbeki reiterated that the Taiwan trip did not change the ANC’s 
stance regarding the One China policy.114 Qian’s memoir supports this internal memo, further 
relaying what Mbeki had said: 
The ANC recognizes the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of the 
whole of China, and will never betray its old friend. The ANC will make great efforts to 																																																								
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establish diplomatic relations between China and South Africa. We believe that this goal will 
be achieved in the near future.115 
Mbeki’s reassurances appeared to have calmed the PRC officials, who showed an 
understanding for why Mandela needed to visit Taiwan.116 Mbeki’s comments were at odds 
with Mandela’s reassurances to the ROC. Here we are able to see how the thinking of the 
NEC was not always aligned with the mentality of Mandela. 
 
Mandela’s First Trip to the ROC in July 1993 
Mandela’s trip to the ROC in July 1993 secured great financial support for the ANC, with 10 
million USD being given to Mandela during his first encounter with President Lee Teng-
Hui.117 However, the trip was not without inferences to the issues of recognition. When the 
delegation arrived in Taiwan, ROC reporters began asking Mandela about the ANC’s future 
stance on the two China issue. Pallo Jordan remembered how the Taiwanese were anxious as 
to what would be Mandela’s reply.118 Whilst Mandela was politely measured, he said, ‘South 
Africa will remain a member of the United Nations, of many international organisations. We 
will thus be bound to the policies and decisions of these organisations.’119 This was a clear 
confirmation that the ANC would be recognising the PRC, given that the PRC was 
recognised as the legitimate China in the international arena.  This was obviously not the 
response the ROC would have wanted to hear however, over the duration of his stay, 
Mandela repeated reassured the ROC that there would simply be  a ‘new chapter’ in the 
relationship between the ROC and South Africa.120 As to be expected, the trip concluded with 
more financial contributions, including a request from Mandela for a similar vocational 
training centre to what he saw in Taiwan.121  
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Following Mandela’s ROC trip, an article ran in the PRC’s state-owned Xinhua News 
Agency which reported on a recent trip that Joe Slovo had taken to the PRC where, according 
to the article, Mandela had asked Slovo to ‘convey a message of reassurance to the PRC’ 
following his visit to the ROC. This message appeared to also include a reassurance that 
South Africa will recognise the PRC after its election, keeping in line with its One China 
policy.122 Given that the ANC had just acquired great financial assistance from the ROC, 
these supposed ‘messages’ needed urgent clarification. The ANC released a statement 
explaining, “While the ANC stands ready to build a new relationship with the Government of 
Taiwan, whatever our past differences, it will not abandon its longstanding friends [including 
the PRC].”123 The ANC claimed that the message that had been sent was merely Mandela’s 
request that his speeches made during his trip to Taiwan be made available to the PRC 
officials. Li Liqing, the former Director-General of the Africa Bureau of the International 
Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and the official who 
had hosted Slovo whilst he was in China, backed Xinhua’s reporting, confirming that the 
message did include reassurances with regards to the sole recognition of the PRC.124   
 
It was evident that the ANC was trying to placate both Chinas. Minister Qian understood this 
and worried that these trips and conflicting statements indicated that, “The ANC's idea was 
neither to abandon Taiwan nor ignore China's international status and influence.” He 
pondered whether, ‘… they wanted to resort to “dual recognition”.”125 As the 1994 elections 
drew closer, South Africa’s diplomatic relations with the ROC was a political reality that 
became increasingly contested by the international and domestic community. Given that the 
apartheid government had had diplomatic ties with the ROC, it was widely anticipated that 
once the ANC was the ruling party, a diplomatic switch would occur simultaneously. Yet this 
did not happen quite as seamlessly as proponents had hoped.  	
A New Government and a New Approach: Dual Recognition  
 
After the 1994 elections, the DFA decided to participate in a trade show in Beijing. Nina 
Human, who had been placed on the Asia Directorate in 1993 and was tasked with writing 
documentation in preparation for South Africa’s return to the international community, 																																																								122	Xinhua News Service, ‘Mandela Reiterates position of ‘One China’’, Xinhua, 17 August 1993.	
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recalled how the lack of diplomatic relations with the PRC meant that the DFA “had to 
participate under the auspices of the DTI (the Department of Trade and Industry).”126 
Interestingly, all that the department had prepared for the exhibition never arrived and they 
wondered if the host government had perhaps prevented the importation of the materials. The 
group managed to “do some last minute interior decorating at the stall”, and the rest of the 
trip was a success. Human recalls one particular day when her colleague, Christiaan (Iaan) 
Basson, a South African diplomat that had been sent to Beijing to help establish the South 
African Study Centre, or the South African Centre for Chinese Studies, took her to a Chinese 
think tank. Human said to one of the people working there that “the China-Taiwan quarrel 
was a funny quarrel”, to which the man replied, “in one family only the older brother could 
be the boss.”127  
 
Whilst some viewed the two Chinas issue as a ‘family issue’, that which should be resolved 
amongst themselves, others believed a more proactive approach was necessary. At the first 
cabinet meeting after the new government came into power, Joe Slovo requested a document 
on the recognition of China. Human was the person who then drafted this first cabinet 
memorandum, the contents of which she explained stipulated that South Africa should 
recognise the PRC justifying how “Kissinger once said if something is inevitable, you might 
as well do it immediately.”128 Human’s memo was not well received by all within the DFA. 
Rusty Evans, Director General of the DFA, phoned Human “furious about the contents of the 
cabinet memorandum that they dare bring into question South Africa’s well-established ties 
with Taiwan, the so-called ‘free China’.”129  Human said she later learnt that Evans had 
“endeavoured to sideshow the cabinet memorandum for several months in his safe.”130 
Human reasoned that Evans efforts appeared to have been due to his belief that President 
Mandela “had the moral authority to carry off a two China policy.”131 
 
When asked about this, Evans responded that: 
It was a matter of when, for sure. And how, I had a sense also that this was also a domestic 
political standoff between Beijing and Taiwan, and why should we be the kicking ball 
between them? That’s a problem they had among themselves and they should sort it out, in 																																																								
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the meantime we were happy to just stand back and carry on our relationship and build all the 
aspects of a diplomatic relationship with Beijing, which we’d inevitably grow into a full 
relationship, that was our approach.132 
Evans did admit that he initially believed that dual recognition may have been feasible 
saying, “In the early days we thought it was quite a feasible approach to the issue but as time 
went by it became obvious that it wasn’t going to be a sustainable.”133 Although, he believed 
claims that he was anti-Chinese were unsubstantiated, and that his position was that we 
would, of course, recognise China but the question was at what point, and that what was 
necessary was the building of a substantive relationship with China before the switch in 
diplomatic recognition. 
 
When questioned about the belief by some in the department that the flow of information 
from the Asia Directorate to the President was being prohibited, Evans replied: 
No, that’s not true. I would categorically say that there was no intent on blocking a different 
view from the Asia division. I think I have been pretty frank and open about Les, and he was 
a very good official and he did his job very well. Nor, did we have a sense at that time that 
Les is persuaded on their side but we’re on a different side. We were just, ‘we’, ‘Rusty 
Evans’, were just a bit slower in terms of… we were being a little more nuanced, in terms 
of…. He wanted us to go quicker than we were, in terms of the diplomatic, the political 
relationship, not all the other. Diplomatic relations, you know what diplomatic relations are, 
they are not just at the political level you know you build a relationship on the basis of 
substantive matters and he was encouraged to do that, and did it to a large extent. And the 
Taiwanese reacted to that, I mean there was an explosion of interaction in that period since 
they opened the Mission to when this blew up to this point. In fact, I allude to it in this, that 
they are going to hold back on a number of things, but these are things that had already been 
established in that relatively short period. So, we were actually being successful in terms of 
building a diplomatic relationship.134 
Yet, Human was not the only one worried about where documents were going, and if the 
correct information was getting to President Mandela. Minutes from a briefing session on 11th 
October 1995, end with an observation by Mr. G. Pretorius, a deputy-director at the DFA, 
who had worked on Japan, China and Korea. Pretorius noted his concerns saying: 
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It is the considered opinion of the Directorate Asia, that all the facts of the China - Taiwan 
matter are not know to the President - that the information is not being made available to 
him.135 
 
Dissension 
 
Dissension within the DFA 
Whilst it may not have been clear just where the notes and memos were going, it was clear 
that there were some within the DFA that disagreed about switching diplomatic recognition 
to the PRC. In 1995, this was highlighted at the DFA’s Heads of Mission meeting, the first 
since the amalgamation of the departments in the post-democratic era. The meeting occurred 
at Espada Ranch, outside of Pretoria. Nina Human was appointed rapporteur for the Asia 
group and during her report back session to the plenary she recalled that there were “some 
fireworks, largely because the majority in the Asia group had drafted a resolution calling for 
the early recognition of Beijing.”136 One of Human’s former colleagues questioned her on the 
issue of China’s human rights record in Tibet. Human found this ironic because this 
colleague had served in Taiwan and she explained that Taiwan did not recognise the 
independence of Tibet either. From here “a real bun fight started as various members of the 
audience raised their opinions on the issue of the China-Taiwan debate.”137 Deputy Minister 
Aziz Pahad, who was on the podium beside her, said to Human that he would deal with the 
matter which she concluded that he did “very professionally.”138 
 
Botha too recalled the tensions that arose during this Heads of Mission meeting, further 
explaining how: 
… yes, there was a total split on that. And, I wonder if I can remember what we, we were 
very unhappy and it was basically left in the air… Many of us spoke in favour of the switch, 
and there were those who were against… It got quite acrimonious. And as I recall, there was a 
split in the ANC too, but it was mainly the old South African department that was arguing the 
case, as I recall.139   
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At the same time as the Heads of Mission meeting, there was a department called the ‘Guest 
Programme’, and the head of the mission in Beijing, Les Labuschagne, sent the president of 
the Chinese Institute of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Liu Shuqing to South Africa. Dr. Lui Shuqing’s 
institute, as explained by Human, “dealt a lot with countries that had not yet established 
relations with China”.140 Human, Dr. Liu Shuiqing, Aziz Pahad, and Ji Peiding flew to Cape 
Town where they met Thabo Mbeki, Alfred Nzo, and F.W. de Klerk. The intention of Dr. Lui 
Shuqing’s trip was to persuade South Africa to change relations. What Dr. Lui was most 
likely not aware of was the dissension within the Mandela administration, the DFA and the 
NEC. The discrepancies in viewpoints and statements was alarming. Nina Human referenced 
this in one of the departmental minutes in October 1995, saying that: 
A problem we face is the fact that President Mandela has made contradictory statements on 
the nature of our relations with the Chinese i.e. that South Africa would follow international 
diplomatic practice and, on our relations with Taiwan, that South Africa would not break 
diplomatic relations.141  
 
As time passed, those within the DFA did not completely understand Mandela’s reluctance to 
announce what was, to them, an inevitable decision. PJ Botha remembered how the PRC’s Ji 
Peiding was equally confused and would visit him in the hopes of establishing where 
Mandela stood with regards to the China decision. Botha eventually explained to Ji that the 
switch would be decided in the ANC: 
You’re not going to get this thing switched in DFA…you need to work within the 
ANC, because that is where the decision will be made. And it’s within the ANC that 
they can put sufficient pressure on Mandela to see the benefits, and to make him face 
up to what the reality is in the international community, in terms of China.142 
Here we see how those within the DFA were attentive to the reality that the ANC would be 
making the decision in their collective capacity as the ruling party. This further confirms the 
notion of party elites within the ANC controlling the decision, and thus the limitations of 
FPDM in explaining the role of party elites. However, this is not to say that the DFA did not 
affect the decision. Letters that were drafted by the DFA’s East Asia Directorate and sent 
from Nzo to President Mandela were able to influence his understanding of the need and 
increasing urgency to recognise the PRC. Like Mbeki, officials in the directorate including 																																																								
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Basson, Human and Labuschagne understood that Beijing would never accept dual 
recognition and that it was becoming crucial to convince Mandela of this or risk angering the 
PRC.  
 
Dissension within the ANC 
Mbeki was not the only member of the ruling party who understood the PRC’s resolute 
stance on the One China policy. Four prominent ANC MPs, Raymond Suttner, Blade 
Nzimande, Max Sisulu, and Danny Jordaan accompanied Nzo on the delegation to the PRC 
in 1995. Suttner’s own writing has shown that he supported the switch in recognition to the 
PRC,143 and Nzimande had also made it known that he also saw the necessity for recognition 
of the PRC.144 The composition of the delegation, and the individuals supporting the switch 
in recognition, did not mean, at the time, that there was consensus within the ANC. In fact, a 
lack of consensus on the ‘Two China’ issue in and amongst the ANC was evident when Joe 
Modise, Defence Minister explained in May 1996 that they wanted relations with the PRC 
but did not want to hinder their relations with the ROC.145 Contrastingly, ANC MP and chair 
of the portfolio committee on trade and industry, Edna Molewa, was quoted a few days later 
saying that the ANC would establish relations with the PRC even if it meant severing 
diplomatic ties with Taiwan.146  
 
Similarly, the Minister of Public Service and Administration, Zola Skweyiya, met with Qian 
Qichen in August 1996 where he informed the Foreign Minister that the NEC had decided 
that South Africa would recognise the PRC. However, Skweyiya did also mention that there 
had been a debate within the ANC regarding the ‘Two China’ issue. Skweyiya also conveyed 
Mandela’s hesitancy and desire for dual recognition however Qian made it quite clear that the 
PRC would not entertain that idea.147  
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Popo Molefe, the Premier of the Northwest Province, was one of the key ANC officials 
leveraged by the PRC to gain support. In August 1996 he was invited to the Beijing to 
discuss the PRC’s proposed infrastructural investment in South Africa, deemed ‘Dragon 
City’. News reports from the time indicate that the investment was between $12 and $18 
billion USD. It was understood that this investment was contingent on the diplomatic 
recognition of the PRC.148 
 
The inclusion of these individuals in this section of the report is necessary for confirming an 
earlier critique in the theory chapter – that of elite theory often viewing elites as one 
homogenous group. What is evident from the above recollections of the ANC and NEC 
members is that whilst the NEC would eventually find consensus on the ‘Two China’ issue, 
seemingly in August of 1996, as Minister Skweyiya relayed to Foreign Minister Qian,149 the 
political elites were not immune from dissension. Future elite theory frameworks would do 
well to provide leeway for potential divergences amongst elites.   
 
Public Diplomacy  
Later in 1995, the DFA arranged a conference with the South African Institute of 
International Affairs (SAIIA) and the Foundation for Global Dialogue entitled ‘South Africa 
and the two Chinas Dilemma’. Much of the discussions that emanated from this conference 
provided the base literature from which this research report formed, and remains an important 
secondary source contribution that highlight the debates and position of academics and 
policy-makers at the time of the China dilemma.150 Correspondingly, and rather comically, an 
antithetical conference was convened by the Consulate-General of the ROC after the SAIIA 
Conference occurred, entitled ‘The Taiwan Experience: Implications for South Africa’.151 																																																								
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Whilst Mandela did not attend either conference, one of the papers was found amongst the 
archival documentation with his personal papers. The paper in question was Deon 
Geldenhuys’ South Africa and the China question: A case for dual recognition. Vol. 6. East 
Asia Project (EAP), (Dept. of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand, 
1995). Given knowledge that Mandela had high hopes for the pursuance of dual recognition, 
it is interesting that this paper had made its way into his collection of papers. FPDM does not 
consider the role of non-state actors, such as think-tanks, research institutes, and study 
centres, in influencing the decision making that occurs. These two conferences, and the way 
in which their research infiltrated even the presidential office, is evidence enough that their 
inclusion in theories of foreign policy decision making is of great importance.   
 
1996 UNCTAD Conference  
Despite the President’s desire for dual recognition, his respect for the democratic process was 
evident when Madame Wu Yi, the Head of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation, visited South Africa in April 1996 for the UNCTAD Conference. 
She was informed by Mandela that there was growing consensus within the NEC to recognise 
the PRC. Yet, in continuing his modus operandi, Mandela stressed the need for a measured 
way forward and his desire to first justify and explain to the Taiwanese about the switch.152 
The President appears to have been sincere about this, as he tried to secure a meeting with 
President Jiang Zemin shortly after Wu’s trip. Zemin had been travelling throughout the 
continent however, the meeting did not take place. It is not clear if this was because of 
schedule conflicts or if Mandela had been discouraged from meeting Zemin on the basis of 
the possible Chinese wrath if the meeting went ahead.153 
 
The fact that Mandela mentioned the NEC in his talk with Madame Wu reaffirms his 
adherence to the collective decision making capacity of the NEC. It would appear that an 
announcement by Mandela was imminent given the consensus in the NEC. Yet, Mandela was 
still hopeful that dual recognition might be feasible, especially if the ROC and the PRC were 
to resolve their dispute. This hope was often interpreted as South Africa ‘fence-sitting’, as 																																																																																																																																																																												
Dilemma’, The Taiwan Experience: Implications for South Africa (Johannesburg: The Consulate-General of the 
Republic of China, 1995), 157-174, and C. Su, ‘Cross Strait Relations and the Republic of China’s Foreign 
Policy’, The Taiwan Experience: Implications for South Africa (Johannesburg: The Consulate-General of the 
Republic of China, 1995),149-156.  
152 Qichen, Qian. Ten episodes in China's diplomacy. (New York City, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 
2005), 223-224.  
153 DIRCO, Folder 1/24/3, A. Nzo letter to N. Mandela, 7 May 1996. 
	 52	
depicted in the below 1996 Zapiro cartoon. South Africa was in its third year as a diplomatic 
country and yet it had still not achieved consensus regarding the China decision. Nzo, as 
foreign minister, was constantly having to reassure either the Taiwanese or Chinese about 
which China South Africa was going to choose.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cartoon by Zapiro, Sowetan © 1996. All rights reserved - For more Zapiro cartoons 
visit www.zapiro.com 
Objective of Minister Nzo’s 1996 Mission  
An additional round of trips to both Taiwan and Beijing in 1996 served the purpose of 
ascertaining where South Africa stood with the respective Chinas and afforded the 
delegations opportunities to compile reports, only after which was the decision then made in 
the NEC. This appears to have been a matter of principle: 
… it would not have been fair to have a major decision like that without having visited both 
Chinas. And that was part of the plan to visit both, and then report on both, as well as our own 
recommendations… Individuals might have decided on their own “look man, there’s no point 
even going to Taiwan”, quite possible, but for the purpose of objectivity, and whatnot, we had 
to give a report on both countries. Or visit both of them.154 
Sisulu recalled how there was more than one purpose of the mission: 
First one was to establish formally… in the past we had a relationship as the ANC, not in 
government, now we’re in government, it was to formalise that relationship. Government to 
government. Party to party relationship. That’s why we went to China, and it also was to, in a 																																																								
154 M, Sisulu, interview by C. Williams, Johannesburg, 28 February 2017. 
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sense, thank the Chinese for the contribution that they made to the struggle. They didn’t 
contribute as much as the Russians did but it was a contribution. But also it was to make a 
point that our policy, foreign policy, would be determined by ourselves. We can’t expect 
somebody, not Russia, not China, not anybody, not America. We’re very proud about our 
independence, and therefore we made sure that in any relationship it would not be at the 
expense of our own policies. Maybe when we still freedom fighters, the situation was a bit 
different but now that we are an independent country we exercise our independence. Also in 
terms of who we want to have relations with and the nature of the relationship, or the extent 
of the relationship. So, we accept that yes, we are good friends with Mainland China, always 
been, but we accept that we also have relations with other countries.155 
 
Whilst the Mission was referred to as a ‘fact-finding’ mission, it does not appear that there 
were many facts to find, in relation to the China decision and the notion of dual recognition. 
Those that were on the trip knew that dual recognition was not an option the PRC would 
accept, and knew that South Africa’s recognition of the PRC was imminent: 
Well, it was clear to us even before we went to China. We were not going to China to 
persuade China to have a special relationship with us. It was a fact-finding mission, and we 
had honest, frank discussions with China, and the Chinese told us, basically, what we already 
knew. It wasn’t like it was a shock, we knew this.156 
It would appear to be strange that such a high-level delegation was convened if it was already 
understood that the China decision had already been made within the NEC however, the 
mission was at the special request of President Mandela. Sisulu explained that the trip came 
from “the insistence of Mandela that there should be a high-level delegation to China, led by 
Nzo, not anybody else.”157 Sending Nzo was a clear message that South Africa was serious 
about its ties with the PRC. Also, Sisulu clarified that although it had been clear to the ANC 
for some time that recognition of the PRC was crucial, the decision was only officially made 
after the mission returned and the report had been drafted. Additionally, he suggested that 
this may have been one last attempt by President Mandela to ascertain just how unachievable 
dual recognition was: 
And we also had to come back and talk to Mandela, who might not have been on the same 
wavelength as everybody, and so we had to go and comeback and give a report, and after that 
report a decision was then taken. It could not have been taken before. So this was an 
important mission, and it took a bit long, but because it’s the nature of the thing. You’re 																																																								
155 M, Sisulu, interview by C. Williams, Johannesburg, 28 February 2017. 
156 Ibid.  
157 Ibid.  
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talking about the future, long-term relationships; it’s not just, you know, Lesotho… That’s 
why it took a couple of months because it was also debated internally in the NEC of the ANC, 
the Executive Committee of the ANC.158 
He clarified that this different wavelength was President Mandela’s desire for dual 
recognition: 
Part of the visit was to just gauge if it was possible, so clearly after that visit it was not 
possible to have the same kind of relations between the two. The Chinese made it abundantly 
clear to us. They would NOT accept that.159 
 
Whilst the ANC was well aware of President Mandela’s desire to achieve dual recognition, it 
was equally clear that the China decision would be a collective one within the structures of 
the NEC.  
Yes Mandela, who had his views but the views of an individual in the ANC cannot overwrite 
the collective decision making process. Once the report was out there, people in the ANC 
went “this is it”. You can’t change Chinese position. And China’s an important player and so 
we had to recognise that. And also, a lot of us didn’t feel particularly sympathetic to Taiwan 
because they never supported us in the struggle, China did. So it was not a difficult decision 
to make. It was realistic, it was in line with what’s happening globally, and it also didn’t feel 
particularly pained by it… 
 
Following the presidential delegations to the ROC and PRC in 1996, a memorandum was 
drawn-up and deduced that whilst the ‘Two China’ issue would be best resolved amongst the 
PRC and the ROC, it did not seem like a likely outcome. The memo also made mention to 
Mandela’s attempts to act as a mediator in the dispute countering with the reality that the 
PRC would not accept foreign involvement or mediation. The report concluded that, given 
the upcoming transfer of Hong Kong back to PRC sovereignty: 
Our view is that it is in line with our interests as a country to establish diplomatic 
relations with the PRC as a matter of urgency…Regrettably, it is our view that there 
is no alternative way of establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing, other than 
transforming relations with Taiwan into unofficial relations.  We believe that this 
must be managed in a manner that is as sensitive as possible.  But the choice is 
unavoidable.  We believe that is essential to now move swiftly.160  																																																								
158 M, Sisulu, interview by C. Williams, Johannesburg, 28 February 2017. 
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Yet, the ‘seesaw’ nature continued in spite of the memo’s concerns. In July, whilst Nzo was 
in Taiwan many believed he was there to prepare the ROC for the switch in recognition, yet 
back in South Africa Mandela told journalists that: 
Taiwan supported us during the later phase of the struggle against apartheid…as did 
the People’s Republic of China.  It is not easy for me to be assisted by a country, and 
once I come to power say ‘I have no relations with you.’  I haven’t got that type of 
immorality and I will not do that.161  
Additionally, in August 1996, Mandela referenced Taiwan as a country whilst an ROC 
delegation was visiting South Africa. His statements, justifiably, exasperated the PRC who 
believed South Africa was close to formally recognising them.162  
 
By August 1996, the ANC’s NEC had decided that formal diplomatic relations with the PRC 
needed to be established. Mbeki realised that President Mandela was still convinced of a dual 
recognition approach. Mbeki held a meeting to discuss the ‘China issue’ with Rusty Evans, 
Aziz Pahad, and Alfred Nzo in what appeared to be an attempt to place pressure on Mandela 
to make the switch. When Mbeki questioned the group about any objections to announcing 
diplomatic recognition of the PRC, Evans presented Mandela’s belief that South Africa 
should try a dual recognition approach. Evans further justified Mandela’s stance as being the 
result of his relationship with Ambassador Loh and the debt he felt he owed the Taiwanese. 
This did not sit well with Mbeki. He informed Evans that South Africa had to recognise 
China, and that they would begin a process to switch recognition.163 The implication that 
‘they’ would begin the process shows the separation between the NEC and the President at 
the time. The NEC were not willing to wait to see if dual recognition could be achieved. They 
understood the impossibility of the PRC accepting dual recognition. Likewise, the NEC was 
aware of Hong Kong’s return to Chinese sovereignty and what this meant for South Africa.  
 
It is interesting that Mbeki invited three senior DFA individuals, Evans, Pahad and Nzo and 
did not speak directly to Mandela about the NEC’s decision. Perhaps there are other 
explanations for this, schedule conflicts for one, yet, it could be perceived as an indication 
that Mbeki believed that it would be better if the three officials would convince Mandela to 
make the announcement, as opposed to Mbeki convincing Mandela. It is also interesting how, 																																																								
161 Sapa-AFP, ‘Taiwan Connection: Still Firm Friends,’ The Daily News, 4 July 1996.   
162 A. Pahad, interview by C. Williams, Johannesburg, 7 March 2017. 
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if the NEC had already made the decision, why it would take a further three months until 
Mandela announced the decision in November? Perhaps the channels in the decision making 
schema of the NEC are not as clear as believed. Given that the archival evidence does not 
provide explanations for this, nor did the interviewees, we are unable to clarify this. When 
analysing other foreign policy decisions it would be beneficial to remember the agency of the 
President. Whilst Mandela may not have had the autonomy to continue to pursue dual 
recognition when the NEC had decided, he perhaps had agency in deciding when and how he 
would announce the decision.   
 
On 26 November, one day prior to Mandela’s announcement, he informed Loh I-Cheng of 
the switch in diplomatic recognition at a meeting which Rusty Evans was present at. Mandela 
explained to Loh how it was an ANC decision “… it’s out of my hands. It’s the organisation, 
you know.”164 Aside from Evans’ recollection of Mandela’s meeting with Loh, at which he 
was present, Evans surmised that he did not believe that the decision was a ‘Nelson Mandela’ 
decision, and that “I think it was an ANC decision taken within the coherent structures of the 
ANC, at that time.”165 Max Sisulu agreed, and clarified that, as a member of the ANC’s NEC, 
‘We had made our decision collectively, so the ANC had decided that this is the best way to 
go…The recommendations coming from Nzo’s mission. And so, Madiba had to live with it. 
That’s the nature of a democracy.’ 166  Sisulu concluded how this showed Mandela’s 
adherence to the collective decisions of the NEC. This further confirms the role of elites in 
South Africa’s China decision, and in particular, the role of the NEC in South Africa’s 
foreign policy decision making, a reality that current FPDM models do not explain.  
 
Previous commentators on the ‘Two China’ issue believed the decision was entirely in the 
hands of President Mandela.167 The archival documentation and interviews have proven this 
to be untrue, and have indicated that there was a very intricate relationship between Mandela 
and the ANC. Mandela did not make the decision but rather accepted the decision that had 
been made within the structures of the NEC. 
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Consensus  
On the 4th November 1996, Nzo’s final letter on the subject of the ‘Two China’ issue was 
sent to Mandela (See Appendix 5). This emphasised the unequivocal view that South Africa 
had to recognise the PRC as Nzo stressed how the PRC could close the Consul-General in 
Hong Kong, revoke the MFN status, and cause other economic challenges for South Africa in 
relation to the trade with Hong Kong. The severity of the potential backlash for South Africa 
appears to have been conveyed aptly, and after almost thirty months of trying to achieve dual 
recognition, President Mandela finally accepted the collective decision of the NEC and 
announced the severance of diplomatic ties with Taiwan and the entrance into formal 
diplomatic relations with the PRC.168 Sisulu recalled: 
Mandela’s a person of strong views to try and persuade, but also he’s a democrat when 
decisions are made, collective decisions. He’ll stick by those, he won’t seek to change them 
alone. He would want to persuade people but if that doesn’t work, and there’s a collective 
view on a matter, he’ll stick with it and pursue it. So he’s not like a godfather, “you must do 
as I tell you”. He’s got strong views and he articulates them, he doesn’t shy away from 
articulating his views, but once a collective decision has been made, he abides by it.169 
 
Although it has been shown that there were many factors influencing the decision, during the 
announcement, and as indicated in the simultaneous press release (See Appendix 6), Mandela 
provided just one reason for the switch in diplomatic recognition: 
In its international relations, South Africa has become an active participant within the ambit 
of the OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as within the UN system. A permanent 
continuation of diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China on [sic] Taiwan is 
inconsistent with South Africa’s role in International affairs.170 
 
Yet, when Mandela was interviewed by journalist Tim Modise in February 1997, he made no 
reference to the ‘international relations’ factor but did confirm the dual recognition 
negotiations, concluding how this was not feasible and that a choice had to be made: 
We negotiated with them (Beijing and Taipei), over these last two and a half years, to 
say we are prepared to retain our diplomatic relations with Taiwan and at the same 
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time establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China…but we 
couldn’t resolve the position in that way. We had to choose between the two…171 
 
Mandela’s use of “we” in the above quotations echo the eventual collective decision making 
that occurred. This chapter has analysed the narrative that played out, as supported through 
the archival documentation and the interviews, ultimately showing that whilst there were 
initially internal disagreements within the ANC’s NEC and the DFA’s Asia Directorate about 
the prospects of dual recognition, the majority of its respective MPs and officials realised that 
the establishment of diplomatic relations with only the PRC was the only way forward. The 
NEC was therefore at the helm of this decision making process, followed by the DFA’s role 
in ensuring that their research and information pertaining to the recognition issue reached the 
President’s Office.172 These two ‘bodies’ were able to turn dissension into consensus in order 
to convince and pressure Mandela to make the announcement that would be in South Africa’s 
best interest. 
*** 
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Chapter Four 
Chinese Diplomacy 
 
“To be honest, although there was competition, we and the mainland, in the fight for 
diplomatic relations, never engaged in ‘auction bidding’.” – Ambassador Loh, in his memoir 
Valiant but Fruitless Endeavors. 
 
The above translation taken from Loh’s memoir is rather amusing. It is in reference to when 
he was asked by President Lee in November 1992 how much money the ROC should donate 
to South Africa, and Loh replied with the amount of $10 million. He explained that perhaps 
he was “sub-consciously” thinking of the PRC’s donation in October 1992, coincidentally 
also $10 million.173 Not only does Loh’s own words do little to dispel notions of ‘auction 
bidding”, the archival evidence and interviews have shown that there were definite elements 
of ‘chequebook’ diplomacy, from both Taiwan and Beijing, in their attempts to secure sole 
diplomatic representation. The following chapter explores these attempts through the 
recollections of the key Chinese protagonists on either of the Taiwan strait, Qian Qichen, the 
PRC Foreign Minister, and Loh I-Cheng, the ROC’s Ambassador to South Africa. 
Additionally, an incorporation of Taiwanese and Chinese news reports from the time will be 
discussed to provide an understanding of how South Africa’s decision making was perceived 
by the two Chinas. Existing literature on the switch has given little attention to these 
recollections that provide necessary perceptions to the interjections of South African 
perspectives.  
 
As 1995 progressed, it became clear that South Africa’s China decision had still not been 
made, or rather, President Mandela’s dual recognition approach was still being embraced. 
This uncertainty fuelled anxiety amongst the Taiwanese and the Chinese. In February 1995, 
Ji Peiding met Thabo Mbeki to emphasise that the PRC sought to normalise relations 
between themselves and South Africa; for South Africa to withdraw recognition of the ROC 
and enter into diplomatic relations with the PRC. Mbeki, unlike Mandela, knew that the 
possibility of achieving dual recognition was not strong and thus saw ‘the switch’ as 
imminent. The deputy-president agreed with Ji’s desire to formalise relations, and promised 																																																								
173 I-C. Loh, Valiant but Fruitless Endeavors: The Memoirs of Loh I-Cheng (微⾂無⼒可回天--陸以正的外交
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to speak with Minister Nzo.174 Mbeki’s pro-PRC stance was not welcomed by Ambassador 
Loh whose friendship with Mandela was a stark contrast to his interactions with Mbeki.  
 
The ROC’s Efforts 
 
Mandela and Loh 
Throughout Loh’s memoir he emphasised the supposed close friendship he had with 
President Mandela, reiterating how his “personal relationship with Mandela, after he became 
president, developed further”. He also included references to times Mandela called him at his 
residence, even spending time speaking to Loh’s wife, Jane. 175  These sentiments are 
confirmed by some of the interviewees. Sisulu explained how “Mandela had good personal 
relations with the Ambassador from Taiwan, he was a very good guy, he invited us to his 
house, with my dad, gave us very good food. But that didn’t change our minds about China, 
Mainland China.” Whilst Sisulu appears to recall Loh fondly, others were more sceptical of 
his character and the strength of this ‘friendship’: 
I heard a lot about this relationship, and Ambassador Loh I Cheng was not shy to boast about 
his relationship with President Mandela and also other politicians. He was always name 
dropping, and who he saw, what they discussed, but at the same time did it help him? He saw 
a lot of people in the political parties, ANC, IFP, but how close his relationship was, I cannot 
say, but he claimed he was close. But I always took it with a pinch of salt.176  
 
Basson’s view of Loh was shared by Ambassador Botha who also questioned the 
materialisation of the ROC’s promised, particularly regarding investments they promised: 
... I know Ambassador Loh was, and I could never figure it out, from Taiwan, was very 
connected. I think it was his third posting in South Africa. But he was not a pleasant person to 
deal with, he was quite aggressive, quite, I don’t think he gives Taiwanese a good shake. I 
know that he got very angry with Nina and me, and wrote about us in his books, because we 
were “obstructionist” and “pro-Beijing”, which was never the case, but I think he was the one 
who drove all of it, when he was here. And I think when the switch was made, I think what 
they did, their strategy was to hang these carrots out there and to drag them out as long as 																																																								
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possible. And I think he was very impressed that it took up to 1998, before officially. So he 
actually gave Taiwan another four years which nobody expected, so there was always going 
to be these carrots and these projects, and it was incremental, but so slow, that they could drag 
them on. Again, I might do them a great injustice but that was just my assessment of the 
dissidence.177 
 
Although Loh did not mention Botha in his memoir, he did specifically mention Nina Human 
when stating that South African diplomats experienced pressure from Beijing, saying that 
“although she was not a Communist, she saw me as the trouble maker and gave me a hard 
time. I believe she was influenced by CCP’s strategy.”178 Human was well aware of how Loh 
had depicted her saying, “…in his memoirs he referred to me as giving him a very hard time, 
and I was a fellow traveller of the South African Communist Party!” Human denied this, 
insisting she is “a capitalist to the core of my bones”. Whilst her depiction of Loh was not 
entirely favourable either, Human did concede that “Look, I think he was a very good 
diplomatic [sic] for his country, he tried very hard to keep relations.”179  
 
The methods and means of his efforts, although undoubtedly tenacious, appear to have had a 
dubious undercurrent. Human learnt that in May 1994, ‘Pik’ Botha, then the Minister of 
Mineral and Energy Affairs, had given Loh “the word-for-word briefing on the discussion in 
Cabinet surrounding the issue of recognising Beijing and cutting ties with Taipei”. Although 
Loh does not disclose his source, it appears that Human was correct as he specifically 
mentions the Cabinet meeting in question. This meeting saw Joe Slovo, the Minister of 
Housing in the GNU, propose that South Africa should establish ties with the PRC and cut 
ties with Taiwan. Loh said that the SACP were placing increasing pressure on Cabinet to 
switch recognition. Yet, somehow, Loh knows that tensions arose because Slovo did not have 
the support of the entire Cabinet. According to Loh, about half of the ministers were ‘pro-
ROC’, including F.W. de Klerk, ‘Pik’ Both, and Mangosuthu Buthelezi, who apparently 
raised their opposition during the meeting.180  
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Gary Lin’s thesis further confirms that the Taiwanese had access to notes from the Cabinet. 
Lin, utilising the Taiwanese embassy’s archives, cites the same meeting although, he 
included Joe Modise and the Director-General of Foreign Affairs, Leo ‘Rusty’ Evans, as 
being ‘pro-ROC’. 181  Whilst Evans denied being ‘pro-ROC’, during his interview he 
explained why it was perceived that he was ‘pro-ROC’. In particular, he spoke about a 
meeting convened in August 1996, by Thabo Mbeki at his home in Pretoria. Those attending 
included Alfred Nzo, Aziz Pahad, and Evans. According to Evans, Mbeki asked “Is there 
anyone here who is not persuaded that we have to recognise China?” Evans, guided by 
Mandela’s stance of dual recognition, told Mbeki that: 
And I said, Mr. [Vice] President, you know, “in a nutshell, our approach to this issue is and 
our understanding of the governmental position on the Chinas is that we should conduct a two 
China policy and string this out at this stage.  Because of the personal relationship between 
the President and the Taiwanese, and the understandings that he has given to the Taiwanese, 
and against the background of the fact that it is obviously inevitable that we are going to 
recognise Beijing, that’s our understanding of it.”182 
Mbeki was not satisfied with Evans’ viewpoint and tasked the assembled people with setting 
a process in motion to recognise the PRC. It is evident that Loh did not share the same 
‘friendship’ with Mbeki, something which Loh had been aware of. Loh explained that he was 
always trying to figure out what Mbeki’s next step was or what was in Mbeki’s mind 
regarding his diplomatic intentions. Loh deems Mbeki as “incomparable” to any other 
politician he had ever met or engaged with before. Loh concluded that he did his best to 
establish a relationship with Mbeki but found him distant. Loh described in his memoir how 
even though he had known Mbeki for quite some time, Mbeki was not someone who let you 
know what he was thinking, and he recalled their interactions in the same vein as playing 
chess, or a “diplomatic minuet”. An example Loh gave was when he wanted Mandela to visit 
the ROC in 1992 but Mbeki wanted to send Walter Sisulu because Sisulu was older and 
about to retire, and would therefore not be seen as being as influential as Mandela. Loh 
believed that Mbeki wanted to send Sisulu because it was less likely to bring great 
attention.183 
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Contrastingly, Loh responded well to Mandela’s charisma, as did Mandela to Loh’s 
appeasing nature. This symbiotic dynamic was not shared with Mandela and the PRC. Evans 
described how: 
Where he had this warm relationship with I-Cheng Loh, I don’t think he had… I don’t think 
the PRC had made any effort to develop a personal relationship with him or with the ANC for 
that matter, in that way. You know, so I don’t think there was a sense of, if you’re talking 
about the personality now, that Mandela had any reason to have a sense of warmth towards 
the PRC, I’m not saying that he was cold towards them, I’m just saying that I-Cheng Loh 
succeeded in, you know, being a good diplomat and establishing a personal relationship with 
the President, with Nelson Mandela of South Africa, and that that counted a lot towards his 
thinking, and in the sense of, the person that he is, him being committed to something, to an 
issue. I-Cheng Loh must get the credit for that.184  
 
Evans went on to clarify that it was not a personal friendship, although he had insinuated 
such when he spoke up to Mbeki, but that Mandela had a high regard for Loh, as an 
Ambassador and that this had contributed to the delay in the announcement of the switch: 
I think that change was possibly delayed by, let’s say six months, just because he felt so bad 
about how I-Cheng Loh was going to feel when he had to eventually tell him it was all over. 
And that eventually happened, of course… And Mandela, I think he had given I-Cheng Loh 
the understanding that as long he is president, we would try and maintain a dual policy, a 
double recognition type thing.  But Beijing had different ideas, and they saw their 
opportunity.185 
 
Whilst the above recollections display different perspectives of the exact nature of Mandela 
and Loh’s friendship, it is clear that Mandela’s loyalty to those that had helped his party, and 
had given promises to aid the country,186 was an important factor in the pursuance of dual 
recognition. Ironically, the very friendship between the South African President and the ROC 
Ambassador appears to have catalysed the timing of the announcement. Loh had informed 
the DFA that the ROC was planning to send its Foreign Minister and President to South 
Africa early in 1997. A visit of this type would have highlighted the close ties between South 
Africa and the ROC, in turn creating a diplomatic disaster for South Africa by triggering the 
wrath of the PRC. The DFA, through Nzo, informed Mandela that the ROC delegation could 																																																								
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not be accepted, contributing to Mandela’s announcement that South Africa would be 
establishing formal diplomatic relations with the PRC, derecognising the ROC.   
 
‘Chequebook’ Diplomacy: ‘Gifts of Guilt’? 
Aside from the role of Mandela and Loh’s friendship, Chinese diplomacy was evident 
through the use of ‘chequebook diplomacy’. Sisulu noted the strength of the Taiwanese 
lobbying, “one thing about the Taiwanese, they are very good at lobbying, like I said we went 
to the Ambassador’s house, and they were very good at lobbying.”187 Sisulu too recalled the 
warm reception in Taiwan yet he saw these efforts as tokens for making up for having been 
supportive of the apartheid government saying: 
The Taiwanese, they also give you lots of gifts, and we couldn’t say “no, we don’t want gifts 
from you”. It was interesting, it was more like making-up for something…We never got 
support from them but we’re now a free country and we have a liberation movement. Mainly 
China gave us guns but Taiwan didn’t give us anything, they support our old regime so there 
was a bit of that, you know, guilt and that kind of thing. But also, we were there to tell them 
we know where you come from but what we want to see you doing is now supporting a new, 
democratic dispensation. In a sense, more investments from you. We, as Mandela said, we 
can forgive you, we won’t forget you supported apartheid… forgive you, but what we want is 
you to continue to support the new democratic dispensation.188   
 
The new government’s approach placed South Africa’s future ahead of past alliances, even 
those as inexcusable as links to the apartheid government. They welcomed Taiwan’s support 
and, as Sisulu observed, this forgiveness was not limited to Taiwan: 
Well, Taiwan had to make those donations because Taiwan was supporting the old order so it 
was important for them to begin to say “look, we now recognise there’s a new dispensation, a 
new democratic dispensation, and we want to contribute, we want to be part of the world, 
we’ll support the new democracy”. And Taiwan was one of those countries that was part of 
those, the change. Taiwan was not the only one, we got support from the United States who 
were supporting apartheid, Germany, so there was a change, to say look, “there’s a change in 
South Africa”, and we were not going to say that “because you supported Apartheid, we don’t 
want your investments, we don’t want you sending skills or anything”.189   
Nina Human also attested to the strength of the Taiwanese use of ‘dollar’ diplomacy: 
																																																								
187 M. Sisulu, interview by C. Williams, Johannesburg, 28 February 2017. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Ibid. 	
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Because, at that time what we also said that the Taiwanese were doing here is ‘chequebook 
diplomacy’. For example they gave a lot of money to Nelson Mandela’s Children’s Fund. 
And they also wanted to open a vocation training centre for MK soldiers.190 
 
The PRC’s Efforts 
 
‘Losing Face’ 
The notion of ‘losing face’, or being internationally shamed, featured in the decision making 
given how the longer South Africa delayed making a decision on the two China issue, the 
greater the embarrassment for the PRC. Botha explained that ‘By not recognising China 
[South Africa was] embarrassing and humiliating China, internationally.’191 The One China 
policy was respected almost universally but South Africa was trying to establish dual 
recognition thus completely undermining the territorial integrity of the PRC. The PRC was 
concerned that if they accepted South Africa’s dual recognition approach, that other states 
would follow similarly. Botha explained how the department were anxious about how the 
PRC may retaliate if South Africa continued to the delay the switch in recognition.  
 
Botha recalled how Ji Peiding would ask him if he was aware of what was happening with 
regards to the recognition issue. Botha explained that he told Ji: 
You’re not going to get this thing switched in DFA…you need to work within the 
ANC, because that is where the decision will be made. And it’s within the ANC that 
they can put sufficient pressure on Mandela to see the benefits, and to make him face 
up to what the reality is in the international community, in terms of China.192  
Botha’s advice to Ji was sound, as evidenced through the archival documentation and 
interviews included in Chapter Three of this research report, the NEC would ultimately make 
the decision in August 1996, but prior to then, confusion would continue to frustrate the PRC. 
 
Prior to his elections, President Mandela had made statements about how South Africa would 
adhere to the international arena on the matter of the two Chinas dilemma, technically 
signalling their imminent recognition of the PRC therefore, the PRC were not impressed that 
the still did not have official diplomatic relations by 1995. In April of 1995, Mandela further 
confused the situation when he was quoted saying that: 																																																								
190 N. K. Human, interview by C. Williams and C. Hurst, Pretoria, 5 December 2016. 
191 P. J. Botha, interview by C. Williams, Cape Town, 17 February 2017. 
192 Ibid. 
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We are part of the United Nations, and follow the policy of the United Nations.  But 
nevertheless, we are an independent and sovereign country, and our relations with countries is 
[sic] determined first and foremost by our own interest.  Now, it is in our interest to maintain 
diplomatic relations with Taiwan.193   
This statement by President Mandela was welcomed by Ambassador Loh, who increased the 
number of South Africa’s being sent on trips to the ROC, as Botha recalled how Loh: 
Invited almost every Member of Parliament to Taiwan, and I believe when you got 
off the plane you got $5000 USD? as a spending allowance. $5000, at that stage, was 
big money, 1994/95, for South Africans, it was serious, especially for a lot of MPs 
who had been living very harshly in exile. So they literally bought the whole 
parliament.194  
Not everyone saw this as positive for South Africa’s international image. Greg Mills 
concluded that, ‘It is extremely embarrassing that the Taiwanese seem to be buying our 
foreign policy.’195 Yet, Loh was on top form. In November 1995 he wrote an Op-Ed in the 
Business Day where he advertised the training programmes of the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) that the ROC had aided South Africa with.196 The close 
financial ties between the ROC and South Africa were further confirmed in December 1995 
when Mandela confirmed that the ROC had given a “substantial” donation to the ANC for the 
1994 elections, something that had always been suspected. Mandela also confirmed another 
suspicion, that South Africa would not be recognising the ROC, given their friendship.197  
Mandela deemed an agreement to construct the training facility ‘an expression of just how far 
those relations [between the RSA and ROC] have been expanded.’198 
  
The Asia Directorate were not happy with the ROC’s utilisation of ‘chequebook diplomacy’ 
because part of their initial assessments under the new administration was going through all 
projects that the ROC had promised to see if they had kept their word. Botha confirmed that 
the ROC ‘didn’t put their money where their mouth is […] we did an assessment of the 
impact and investment, and it actually was a bit of a paper tiger, it wasn’t there.’199   																																																								
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Foreign Minister Qian confirmed in his memoirs that he too was suspicious of the intentions 
of the ROC’s pledges. When he met Mbeki in 1993, and was informed of Mandela’s trip to 
accept Taiwan’s donation to the ANC, he told Mbeki: 
The ANC should be alert to this kind of activity on Taiwan’s part. It is 
understandable that you accept the aid, but you should by no means accept any 
attached political conditions.200 
Yet, the ROC’s financial contributions could not match the political clout of the PRC.  
 
Means of Coercion 
The PRC appeared to favour methods of tactic ‘coercion’, as opposed to ‘chequebook’ 
diplomacy. In March 1995, Ji Peiding informed Les Labuschagne ‘that should South Africa 
wish to enter diplomatic relations in the not near future then it could be that China at that 
stage would in all likelihood not be interested or amenable.’  Ji also reminded Labuschagne 
that the status quo would not continue for South Africa once Hong Kong had reverted back to 
Chinese sovereignty. Labuschagne’s warned the department that ‘It would seem as if the 
velvet glove covering the iron fist is wearing thin and I interpret the oblique message as an 
indirect indication that China is not prepared to lose face over the South African issue.’201   
 
In November 1995, when Mandela requested backing from the PRC in order to condemn 
Nigeria’s Sani Abacha’s regime’s hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa,202 in the UN Security Council, 
his letter to President Jiang Zemin was not as helpful as he had hoped. In the letter, the PRC 
president reminded Mandela of his 1992 visit to China and the statement which he made 
about how the new democratic South Africa would tackle the China decision in accordance 
with the international arena. Zemin stressed that the issue of Taiwan ‘bears on China’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity and involves the fundamental interests of the Chinese 
nation and the feelings of the 1.2 billion Chinese people.  China can never accept the so-
called ‘dual recognition’.203 Zemin was making it clear that South Africa needed to recognise 
the PRC as the sole China.  
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The notion of making things ‘clearer’ was mirrored by Qian’s recollection. He recounted a 
conversation with Nzo in late 1996 where he indicated: 
I made it clear to Nzo that China would not oppose South Africa’s having economic and trade 
relations with Taiwan after the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and 
South Africa. On the contrary, China would be glad to see the development of economic and 
trade relations between South Africa and Taiwan as long as the relations were 
nongovernmental.204 
Qian ended his conversation with Nzo with another instance of the PRC’s subtle coercive 
reminders: 
I pointed out that Hong Kong, which had wide economic cooperation with South Africa, 
would return to China in July 1997, and we hoped that Sino-South African relations could see 
substantial development conducive to maintaining mutual economic interests between South 
Africa and Hong Kong. Nzo said that he had obtained a clearer understanding of these issues, 
and would report to President Mandela and urge him to make a decision as quickly as 
possible.205 
Nzo’s 4 November 1996 letter to Mandela confirms that he did report these issues to the 
president, reiterating the direct role that Chinese diplomacy played in the decision making 
process.206 
 
Whilst South Africa was dealing with the two Chinas questions, the UN was in the process of 
appointing its next Secretary-General. The U.S. had made it clear that it would block the 
reappointment of Boutrous Boutrous Ghali yet the majority of the rest of the world, including 
China and the OAU, supported Ghali’s re-election. DFA officials were concerned that South 
Africa would be singled out if China decided to veto Ghali or any other candidate put 
forward by the OAU due to South Africa’s delay in recognising the PRC as the sole China. 
The memoirs of Ambassador Loh confirmed that this contestation was a factor in South 
Africa’s recognition of China, and also mentioned that other African states had begun to 
place pressure on South Africa to recognise the PRC in order for their continued support of 
the OAU’s Secretary-General nominee.  South Africa had also hoped that should the UN 
undergo reforms, they might obtain a permanent seat on the Security Council, something 																																																								
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222. 
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which would not be accepted if South Africa maintained its recognition of the ROC. These 
two factors provide further examples of the way in which PRC coercion influenced the 
timing of the announcement. Whilst the decision to recognise the PRC was decided within 
the collective structures of the ANC’s NEC, this chapter has depicted the importance of the 
efforts of both the ROC and the PRC, and the significant impact these efforts had in firstly 
influencing why Mandela wanted to achieve dual recognition (the ROC’s electoral support, 
and his friendship with Ambassador Loh), and secondly, the timing of the decision (the 
PRC’s ‘reminders’ about Hong Kong’s return to Chinese sovereignty and the adverse impact 
this would have on South Africa if diplomatic relations were not intact).  
 
*** 
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Conclusion 
The 20th Anniversary of Diplomatic Recognition 
 
The 1 January 2018 marked 20 years since South Africa officially established formal 
diplomatic relations with the PRC. This research report’s engagement with newly 
declassified archival documentation, interviews with former South African political elites and 
officials, and the inclusion of Ambassador Loh and Foreign Minister Qian’s memoirs, has 
indicated the many facets of the decision making process and that key players who were 
controlling those processes, ultimately indicating that the decision was made within the 
collective structures of the ANC’s NEC.  
 
The switch had been expected for a number of reasons. Economically, China’s substantial 
growth and the potential this offered for South Africa was at the forefront of why the country 
needed to recognise the PRC over the ROC. In 1995, whilst the ROC was South Africa’s 
greater trading partner, accounting for 3,1% of South Africa’s total trade in comparison with 
the PRC’s 1,3%, when the fact that the PRC had a greater population size and an economy 
larger than the ROC, along with the figures indicating the trade growth between South Africa 
and the PRC between 1989 and 1994, it was clear that trade with the PRC had grown 
significantly faster than with the ROC. Furthermore, when figures were examined in 
conjunction with South Africa’s trade with Hong Kong, the trading totals exceeded that of the 
ROC. This was important given Hong Kong’s imminent return to Chinese sovereignty in July 
1997. The PRC had stressed that the status quo would not continue for countries that traded 
with Hong Kong but did not have full diplomatic recognition with the PRC, incentivising 
South Africa to establish exclusive diplomatic relations with the PRC before the return.  
 
Politically, the realities of the PRC’s power, especially as one of the permanent five in the 
UN Security Council, was of great concern to South Africa as it re-entered the international 
arena after its first democratic elections. At the time, there was far greater diplomatic 
recognition and support for the PRC internationally, with 159 states recognising China, in 
comparison to the 29 that recognised Taiwan, emphasising how the recognition of China had 
become a global norm. Yet, whilst these above reasons were known, the reasoning behind the 
timing of the decision had merely been speculated. When the decision to switch diplomatic 
relations to the PRC was finally announced, almost 30 months later on the 27th November 
1996, Mandela referred only to the inconsistency South Africa’s relationship with Taiwan 
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presented in relation to South Africa’s role in the international arena, specifically mentioning 
its participation in the OAU, the NAM, and the UN. These organisations recognised the PRC 
as the sole China, and thus Mandela was justifying how his country could not belong to these 
international organisations and continue to have diplomatic ties with Taiwan. However, from 
analysis of the DIRCO and Fort Hare archives, and interviews with political elites and 
officials who witnessed this decision making process, it is evident that there were other 
factors that contributed to the delay.  
 
Firstly, it is clear that Mandela’s belief that South Africa could be the first country to achieve 
dual recognition played a pivotal role in the delayed announcement. Most of the ‘fact-
finding’ missions to the PRC were ways for Mandela to ascertain whether a dual recognition 
approach may be accepted by the PRC. After Nzo’s final visit to the PRC, in August 1996, 
before the announcement, his delegation’s report reiterated the need for a decision to be made 
with regards to the two Chinas. By extension, this was a request for President Mandela to 
accept that dual recognition would never be accepted by the PRC. According to the officials 
interviewed, Thabo Mbeki, then Deputy President, had long believed that China would not 
accept a ‘two China’ policy and he played an important role in the consensus that was 
reached within the NEC. President Mandela accepted the NEC’s decision and went on to 
make the announcement, a good indicator of his respect for collective decision structures 
within the NEC. FPDM does not provide explanations for the divergence between party elites 
and their leaders, nor the ultimate adherence by the leaders to their parties’ decisions. Future 
FPDM frameworks would benefit from deconstructing the dynamics between the ruling party 
and its leader in decision making capacities, and the constraints inherent within the party’s 
structures. 
 
Secondly, the DFA, and in particular, the role of Basson, Botha, Human, and Labuschagne 
contributed to the decision.  These individuals from the Asia Directorate gathered and relayed 
the necessary information regarding the PRC and the ROC, as evident in many of the 
documentation where notes drawn up concerning the two China matter often mirrored the 
letters that Nzo sent to President Mandela. 
 
Thirdly, increasing pressure from the PRC became a factor in the timing of the decision. The 
pressure was most visible in Nzo’s 4th November 1996 letter to President Mandela where the 
possible punitive measures the PRC may take were listed. This included Hong Kong’s 
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reversion to PRC sovereignty, and how this may have altered the connections that South 
Africa had with Hong Kong, if the PRC was not recognised as the sole China and diplomatic 
relations with the ROC were downgraded. This pressure had intensified after Mandela’s 
comments in August 1996 when he accidentally referred to Taiwan as a state.207 South Africa 
was condemned in the Chinese state controlled media, as evidenced in documentation 
received by the DFA from Xinhua Agency. Not only was Hong Kong an issue, South 
Africa’s MFN status with the PRC was also a potential benefit that could be withdrawn if the 
switch in recognition did not occur.   
 
As detailed in Chapter Four, Mandela’s friendship with Ambassador Loh also contributed to 
the delay. Whilst those interviewed offered differing perspectives of the strength of the 
friendship, all agreed that President Mandela felt a sense of loyalty to the Taiwanese given 
their financial support during South Africa’s first democratic elections. Aside from the 
election money, the ROC had made assurances to aid South Africa’s in a range of fields, 
including the RDP and the Umkhonto we Sizwe Military Veterans’ Association (MKMCA). 
Ironically, this very friendship catalysed the timing of the announcement. Loh had informed 
the DFA that the ROC was planning to send its Foreign Minister and President to South 
Africa early in 1997. A visit of this type would have highlighted the close ties between South 
Africa and the ROC, in turn creating a diplomatic disaster for South Africa by triggering the 
wrath of the PRC. The DFA, through Nzo, informed Mandela that the ROC delegation could 
not be accepted contributing to Mandela’s announcement.  
 
The fifth factor is echoed in Mandela’s explanation during the announcement on the 27th 
November, that South Africa’s non-recognition of the PRC was “inconsistent” with South 
Africa’s role in the international arena.208 The UN was in the process of its appointment of its 
next Secretary-General, with the U.S. having stated it would block the reappointment of 
Boutrous Boutrous Ghali yet the majority of the rest of the world, including China and the 
OAU, supported Ghali’s re-election. DFA officials were concerned that South Africa would 
be singled out if China decided to veto Ghali or any other candidate put forward by the OAU 
due to South Africa’s delay in recognising the PRC as the sole China. The memoirs of 																																																								
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Ambassador Loh confirmed that this contestation was a factor in South Africa’s recognition 
of China, and also mentioned that other African states had begun to place pressure on South 
Africa to recognise the PRC in order for their continued support of the OAU’s Secretary-
General nominee.  South Africa had also hoped that should the UN undergo reforms, that 
they might obtain a permanent seat on the Security Council, something which would have 
been impeded if South Africa maintained its recognition of the ROC.  
 
These factors explain why the decision took as long as it did and why it was announced when 
it was, they also show the role the NEC’s collective decision making structures had in 
making the decision and ultimately ending President Mandela’s futile attempts at achieving 
dual recognition which, whilst ideal, would never have been entertained by the PRC. South 
Africa had to choose, and the choice had to be the PRC. The way in which the PRC subtlety 
exerted power is indicative of the power differentials that were at play, power differentials 
that the PRC continues to leverage 20 years later.   
 
Since 2009, China has been South Africa’s largest trading partner yet the sustainability of the 
relationship continues to be undermined by these power differentials. An unfavourable trade 
imbalance, along with a trade composition that is harmful to South Africa’s natural resources, 
is impeding the potential for a truly mutually beneficial partnership, and the power leveraged 
by the PRC during the diplomatic recognition deliberations in the 1990s continues to underlie 
the bilateral ties. Whilst this research report is not focussed on providing formal 
recommendations or delving specifically into the current power dynamics, it is hoped that the 
implications of the revelations found within the archival documentation and the interaction 
with those former political elites and governmental officials involved in the decision making 
process, will aid in understanding the foundation upon which the relationship between South 
Africa and China was established in the post-apartheid era.  
 
Finally, this case study provides clarity and insight into how foreign policy decisions were 
made in the immediate post-apartheid South Africa. In particular, within the collective 
capacity and structures of the NEC, with input from the DFA, and not at the sole discretion of 
Nelson Mandela. In January 1997, an article in the Sowetan titled SA’s struggle with foreign 
policy: Unpredictability seems to be one of the salient characteristics of SA policy” criticised 
the way in which South Africa’s foreign policy was developing in the post-apartheid era. 
Specifically, the article deemed its diplomacy to be running on “two separate tracks”: the first 
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being the DFA “where events are weighed in the cold light of history and African National 
Congress policy experts are consulted and options are passed upward through Foreign Affairs 
Minister Alfred Nzo and Deputy President Thabo Mbeki”.209 The second track, according to 
the writer, Donald McNeil Jnr, “is whatever President Nelson Mandela decides to announce”. 
McNeil Jnr went on to provide the then recent announcement of South Africa’s switch in 
recognition from the ROC to the PRC as a paradigm purportedly supporting his argument, 
saying “he (Mandela) sometimes pulls abrupt switches, as he did on November 27, when he 
announced that South Africa would drop diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in favour of 
China”.  
 
Whilst McNeil’s analogy to a ‘two track’ foreign policy decision making process is not 
without merit, the very intricacies of South Africa’s foreign policy decision making process 
cannot be reduced. The archival documentation and interview data have clarified that the 
‘tracks’ were more akin to a ‘jointed-track’ system: the decision to recognise Beijing was not 
one reached at abruptly, nor at the sole discretion of President Mandela. Instead, the 
announcement was the culmination of almost 30 months of deliberation within the 
President’s Office, the ANC’s NEC, and the DFA; a process of building consensus amongst 
the dissension. The importance placed on building consensus amongst dissension is crucial in 
comprehending South Africa’s diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic of China.  
 		 *		 		 		 	
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